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Women's Legal Employment Rights
and Their Application in the
Arbitral Process
By ELIOT A. LANDAU*
and
KERMIT L. DUNAHoo**
THE SPECTACULAR development of labor arbitration as a method
of disputes settlement has been paralleled by the equally spectacular in-
crease of women's participation in the labor force. During the past
fifty years, both situations have undergone extensive and complex
changes. Labor arbitration has become the pre-eminent mode of in-
dustrial disputes determination in the United States. Today, over 95
percent of the collective bargaining contracts in force provide for the
arbitral resolution of contract interpretation disputes.1  The number
of women in the labor force, on the other hand, has quadrupled to
over 31 million since the adoption of women's suffrage in 1919 and
the rate of participation has nearly doubled from less than 23 percent
to more than 43 percent.'
While the increasing involvement of women in the compensated
labor force' has caused many to reevaluate old irrational prejudices and
* A.B., 1963, University of Chicago; J.D., 1967 DePaul University College of
Law. Member, National Labor Panel, American Arbitration Association, and Con-
sultant and Hearing Officer for the Iowa Civil Rights Commission; Assistant Professor
of Law, Drake University Law School.
** B.S., 1963, M.S., 1968, Iowa State University; J.D., 1971, Drake University
Law School. During 1967-February 1971, Mr. Dunahoo served as Research Director
for the Iowa Civil Rights Commission.
1. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931, 1937
n.17 (Aug. 20, 1971).
2. NEw YORK DEP'T OF LABOR, WEEKLY LABOR NEWS MEMORANDUM, Aug.
26, 1970, at 2. See also TIME, July 26, 1971, at 56. For additional references and
citations on the present status of women in the labor force see Landau & Dunahoo,
Sex Discrimination in Employment: A Survey of State and Federal Remedies, 20
DaARE L. REv. 417, 419-21 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Landau & Dunahoo].
3. As distinguished from the housewife labor force which is usually poorly com-
pensated or all too frequently uncompensated.
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stereotypes, sex discrimination in employment still persists widely.
Whether it arises from inferiority complexes, male chauvinism, roman-
tic paternalism,4 or simple fear of job loss and competition, discrimi-
nation frequently denies women equal employment rights with men
without any rational basis. This situation, coupled with the increased
number of women employees covered by collective bargaining con-
tracts which provide for arbitration of grievances, has given rise to a
growing body of arbitration awards concerning sex discrimination in
employment.
Complementing the growth of arbitration and women's partici-
pation in the labor force has been the increase in legislative protections
against sex discrimination-Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act'
being the most notable of recent enactments. In general, Title VII
contains broad prohibitions against violations of employment rights
through discrimination. But one provision, in effect, condones other-
wise illegal sex discrimination in those instances where sex is "a bona
fide occupational qualification [bfoq] reasonably necessary to the nor-
mal operation of that particular business or enterprise." 6
The purpose of this article is to analyze the application of the
bfoq exemption in the arbitral forum as compared to judicial decisions
and administrative guidelines. Problems of application arise when-
ever sex is used as a criterion to justify distinctions in the treatment of
prospective or current employees. The discussion to follow will aim at
determining how well industrial jurisprudence has anticipated and kept
pace with the courts in insuring equal employment rights for both
sexes.
I. The Arbitral Setting
The scope of an arbitrator's jurisdiction is controlled, as a general
rule, by the arbitration clause in the union-management labor contract.
Arbitration clauses usually provide that an arbitrator is limited to in-
terpreting and applying the contract, with no power to modify it.' As
4. Landau & Dunahoo, supra note 2, at 420-22.
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-15 (1964), as amended, (Supp. V, 1971).
6. Id. § 2000e-2(e) (1964). Title VII provides the most far reaching federal
statutory ban on sex discrimination in employment. With certain exemptions, Title
VII outlaws sex discrimination: (a) by private employers (operating in commerce
with 25 or more employees) in hiring, classifying, or firing, and in setting compensa-
tion, terms or conditions of employment; (b) by labor organizations (with 25 or more
members) in excluding, classifying, failing to represent, or expelling members; and
(c) by employment agencies (serving employers with 25 or more employees) in fail-
ing to refer individuals for employment on an equal opportunity basis.
7. See C. UPDEGRAFF, ARBITRATION AND LABOR RELATIONS 111-13 (3d ed. 1970).
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the Supreme Court of the United States has noted: "[A]n arbitrator is
confined to interpretation and application of the collective bargaining
agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial jus-
tice."'  Thus, while an arbitrator cannot interfere with clearly estab-
lished management prerogatives (for example, setting job qualifica-
tions), he nevertheless can definitely determine whether or not an anti-
discrimination clause in a contract is being violated.9 In doing so, he
can look for guidance from many sources (e.g., constitutional and
statutory standards) so long as his award draws its essence from the
contract.10
Arbitrators differ widely over what standard(s) they should ap-
ply in making their determination as to whether the antidiscrimination
clause in a conflict has been violated. If a dispute is under a con-
tract expressly incorporating Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
they are, of course, expected to apply judicial and administrative in-
terpretations of Title VII in deciding whether there has been a viola-
tion. If, on the other hand, a contract includes only a general no-
sex bias clause or no such clause at all, there is widespread disagree-
ment among arbitrators over their responsibility to apply Title VII as
well as its judicial and administrative gloss. Rarely does a contract
forbid application of federal or state law."
One arbitrator, faced with conflicting federal and state law when
deciding whether the antisex bias clause in a contract was being vio-
lated, pointed out the divergency of opinion on his proper role:
There are arbitrators who confine themselves strictly to the con-
tract language and leave employees and unions to the courts or ad-
ministrative tribunals for interpretation or enforcement of statutes
and governmental regulations.
There are other arbitrators, including the arbitrator in this
case, who are of the opinion that contracts include all law applicable
thereto, hence the arbitrator should apply the law (constitutional,
statute, and common) to each collective bargaining agreement.
Other arbitrators take a middle ground expressing the view
that no arbitrator should render an opinion which, if followed,
would require an employer (or union) to breach a statute, and
8. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597
(1960).
9. Phillips Petroleum Co., 68-2 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 4791 (1968) (Allen,
Arbitrator).
10. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597
(1960).
11. But see Mead Corp., 65-2 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 5329, 5331 (1965) (Tal-
ent, Arbitrator).
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that arbitrators may apply the law if it is clear and not ambiguous.' 2
Likewise, another arbitrator held that federal law has superven-
ing effect over both state law and labor contracts. 13  In his opinion,
it was "manifest" that Title VII is the governing standard in sex-bias
grievances.14  Consequently, he felt that a failure to apply Title VIA
to an arbitral dispute "would not only be a disservice to the parties but
an abdication of [his] very function and responsibility as contract des-
ignated arbitrator," since "[tihe collective bargaining relationship
implies a system of industrial jurisprudence operating within a frame-
work of rules of law." 5 This seems to be the prevailing view because
"many arbitrators do not feel that giving recognition to the law
in interpreting contracts is adding to the contract. And ignoring it
would only open Pandora's box."'16 Furthermore, "[a]n arbitrator's
award contrary to public policy and law . . . may not be enforced by
courts"' 7 since "all applicable law must be considered implicitly and
inferentially a part of a compact between entities existing and doing
business under the dominion and sovereignty of a State."'"
12. Simoniz Co., 70-1 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 3092, 3096-97 (1969) (Howlett,
Arbitrator).
13. Avco Corp., 70-1 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 4314 (1970) (Turkus, Arbitrator).
14. Id. at 4316.
15. Id. See also Pennsylvania Elec. Co., 66-3 CCH. Lab. Arb. Awards 5912,
5913 (1966) (Stein, Arbitrator), where another arbitrator observed: "So far as statu-
tory meanings can be ascertained with confidence as to their accuracy, they should be
resorted to in defining those terms of the collective bargaining agreement whose ulti-
mate meaning and application are controlled by the statute. It seems to me improper
and incorrect to define terms in an agreement in a manner plainly inconsistent with
the overriding legal definition, saying to the parties that what is invalid as a matter of
law is proper and correct under the collective agreement, thus necessitating recourse to
administrative agencies and the courts to vindicate a manifest legal right."
16. CCH LAB. LAw REP., UNION CONT. ARm. f 58,596, at 84,294 (1970).
17. W. WILSON, LABOR LAW HANDBOOK 351 (1963).
18. Alsco, Inc., 67-2 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 4304, 4308 (1967) (Altrock,
Arbitrator). See also United Packers, Inc., 62-2 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 5026, 5027
(1962) (Kelliher, Arbitrator), where another arbitrator stated the following: "This Ar-
bitrator is cognizant of the court decisions cited by the Union and the Company as
being controlling in this case. These decisions are not unanimous. Arbitrators are
not bound by judicial precedent. What may be the federal substantive law is not
controlling in an arbitration proceeding wherein the Arbitrator is required to construe
the language of the Contract by application of recognized maxims of contract inter-
pretation and the general understanding of the Parties in the negotiation and adminis-
tration of Collective Bargaining Agreements." A similarly-inclined arbitrator held
that, while a court ruling on the subject matter of the grievance is not binding on the
arbitrator, a court ruling may nevertheless be advanced as evidence in support of a
party's contention. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 67-2 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 5328, 5330
(1967) (Gershenfeld, Arbitrator).
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Nevertheless, some arbitrators feel that they have "no authority to
go beyond the four corners of the contract when resolving a dispute." 19
Accordingly, they have sometimes enforced contract provisions in ob-
vious conflict with federal law and have left grievants to pursue their
legal redress in the courts.20
Agency determinations have also been ignored on occasion. Not-
ing that administrative tribunals function "under different rules, and
for different purposes," one arbitrator said that this no-binding princi-
ple is of particular importance when an agency is permitted "to con-
sider factors outside the applicable labor agreement in reaching its de-
cision. 21
With this quick overview of the arbitral setting completed, our at-
tention will now be focused on how the Title VII bfoq has been ap-
plied. We will examine when and how sex-based standards may be
applied to determine qualifications for employment and what restric-
tions may be placed on working conditions.
I. Employment Qualifications
The initial obstacles women have had to overcome in their efforts
to find work are the various restrictions placed on their free entry into
the labor market. Traditionally, private biases have been supplemented
by discriminatory qualification standards and supported, until re-
cently, by well-intentioned state legislation. Title VII and its bfoq ex-
emption were superimposed on that structure with the hope that their
application through arbitral and judicial proceedings would break down
such discriminatory employment patterns. Slowly, they seem to be
achieving some measure of success.
A. Protective Legislation
The root of women's employment problem has been in the classi-
cal stereotype of women as the "weaker sex" whose functions are con-
fined to the home. In the early 1900's, when sweatshop employment
with twelve-hour and longer workdays of backbreaking labor was a
common condition, states passed "protective legislation" to insulate
women and children from total exploitation and from some of the haz-
ards of industrial employment. Limitations were placed on the num-
19. CCH LAB. LAW REP., UNION CONT. ARB. % 58,596, at 84,293 (1970).
20. Eaton Mfg. Co., 66-3 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 6795, 6800 (1966) (Kates,
Arbitrator).
21. Mercer, Fraser Co., 70-2 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 5033, 5035 (1970) (Eaton,
Arbitrator).
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ber of hours they could be worked in a day or week, on the amount of
weights they could be required to lift or carry, and on many similar
burdens of employment. Unfortunately, while the protective motive
had necessary and noble objectives at the time, the resulting statutory
enactments were used instead by employers as a justification to dis-
qualify women from available employment opportunities. By manip-
ulating the hour or weight lifting requirements incident to a job, em-
ployers could easily render all women ineligible.
1. Pre-Title VII Arbitration Decisions
Prior to the passage of Title VII, women had very little success in
challenging employment discrimination if the defense of protective
legislation was available. Sex-based discrimination which smacked of
stereotyping was usually upheld in arbitral awards. Typically, one ar-
bitrator found that past practices of an employer excluded women from
the production area of his company because of health, safety, and mor-
alistic reasons. In upholding the company's refusal to allow a senior
woman to bump a junior man, he added that state protective laws,
sponsored by companies and unions alike, "illustrate the common goal
of protecting the health and promoting decent working conditions for
females in industry.
22
A common issue to most of the employment practice and protec-
tive law challenges has been whether sex may be the sole criterion in an
employment selection process-whether sex alone may disqualify an
individual from the opportunity of applying and being considered for
a job. Decision makers have been asked to decide whether applica-
tions may be evaluated on the basis of class stereotypes or whether ap-
plicants must be considered on their individual qualifications. Protec-
tive legislation is premised on the traditional stereotype procedure.
The majority of pre-Title VII arbitral awards seem to have fol-
lowed the stereotyped conceptions of women's ability and to have al-
lowed the protective law defense. For example, in one case, an arbi-
trator upheld the layoff of senior women before junior men in jobs in-
volving heavy, dirty, and physically demanding work that "cannot, and
should not, be performed by women. ' 23  Women had at various times
performed substantially all of the heavier work, but only sporadically
and for brief stretches. The woman grievant testified that she had
22. Blaw-Knox Co., 31 Lab. Arb. 488, 491 (1958) (Duff, Arbitrator).
23. Electrical Eng'r & Mfg. Corp., 35 Lab. Arb. 657, 661 (1960) (Roberts,
Arbitrator).
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reservations about being able to perform all of the tasks, yet she was
not given a chance to try to do so. This approach was carried even
further by an arbitrator who upheld the denial of a job to women on
the basis of such factors as safety, convenience, efficiency, and ability
to perform effectively.2 4 The fact that a few females had previously
performed identical or similar duties was ruled immaterial; female ap-
plicants were not entitled even to a thirty-day trial period.
Another arbitrator gave such deference to the past practice of as-
signing women to the particular job of detonator loading as to consider
it a working condition of long standing in that industry.25 The job re-
quired high manual dexterity, an ability generally attributed to
women. The evidence showed that very few males could perform the
work as efficiently and safely. Therefore, the male grievants were con-
sidered to be rightfully rejected even though they were not given an
opportunity to qualify as individuals. Moreover, an expert testified
that the company "would have to screen approximately 100 men in or-
der to find two who could perform this type of work with the same
efficiency and as safely as female employees, and that testing a large
number of male employees at this type of work would greatly in-
crease the possibility of explosions."
2 6
Surprisingly, some arbitrators exacted "individualized" treatment
for both male and female employees long before the enactment of Title
VII. In the absence of nondiscrimination clauses in contracts, these
arbitrators relied upon other provisions in contracts-such as the com-
mon provision that seniority and ability to do the work shall govern in
job rights. For example, one arbitrator in 1945 held that the company
could not layoff senior women "merely because they are women
. .. .*7 Rather, the layoffs "must be considered strictly on an indi-
vidual basis and not on a group basis."'28  Another arbitrator deter-
mined in 1958 that the test of ability to do the job "is not whether
. . . the job is. . . difficult for women to perform, but rather whether
the women have the actual or potential ability or capacity to perform
24. Marathon Elec. Mfg. Co., 31 Lab. Arb. 656, 658 (1958) (O'Rourke, Arbi-
trator).
25. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 27 Lab. Arb. 348 (1956) (Horton, Arbitrator).
26. Id. at 353.
27. Republic Steel Corp., 1 Lab. Arb. 244, 248 (1945) (Platt, Arbitrator). The
company apparently had lowered its standards during the war, but then practiced
wholesale laying off of women after the war (without attention being given to
whether any of the women could meet the reinstated higher standards).
28. Id.
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the job reasonably satisfactorily."29
Several other arbitrators dealt affirmatively with employer stereo-
typing in a variety of other ways. One, recognizing that many men can
cook, rejected a contention that "the male animal suffers from natural
handicaps to perform kitchen duties."" °  Accordingly, he ruled that
an employer violated the seniority recall provision in bypassing a laid-
off male employee for the position of cafeteria helper. Another, ruling
that a contract required bidders to be judged on their individual quali-
fications, pointed out that the employer's "concern" over the health and
safety of its female employees was really a subterfuge for discrimina-
tion.3  He rejected the claim that heavy lifting was required-noting
that the material was moved by mechanical equipment and not by
hand. Also, he felt that the necessity for climbing and crawling around
the stock while taking inventory was "not insurmountable for a female
wearing slacks.
'"3 2
Only a few cases were found which raised the specific issue of
whether an employer had tried to qualify women or had instead ar-
bitrarily acquiesced under the state legislation, and which held that
acquiescence resulted in illegal sex discrimination. In one of these
cases, the arbitrator determined that the employer could have assigned
women employees on other jobs in the department not requiring lifting
in excess of the legal limit for women.33 But in refusing to hire women
in any of the jobs, including those not requiring heavy lifting, the em-
ployer violated the contractual provision concerning seniority. In an-
other case, the arbitrator held that there would not have been an un-
reasonable burden on the employer to have assigned women employees
to jobs not requiring overtime work (in violation of the daily hours
29. Young Spring & Wire Corp., 30 Lab. Arb. 914, 919 (1958) (Prasow, Arbi-
trator). Another arbitrator in 1958, holding that the employer's layoff of senior
women before junior men, determined that "there is no evidence bearing upon the in-
dividual qualifications of the grievants." Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 30 Lab. Arb. 988,
992 (1958) (Doyle, Arbitrator). Placing the burden of proof upon the company to
show "lack of ability of the senior employee," the arbitrator noted that the company
"has chosen, rather, to base its case on the general effect of weight lifting on females
generally."
30. Allied Chem. Corp., 35 Lab. Arb. 268 (1960) (Valtin, Arbitrator).
31. Phillips Chem. Co., 41 Lab. Arb. 411, 412 (1963) (Schedler, Arbitrator).
32. Id. See also National Fireworks Ordinance Corp., 23 Lab. Arb. 289, 295-96
(1954) (Smith, Arbitrator), where an arbitrator, rejecting a claim that the unsuitabil-
ity of the work for women justified the company's refusal to transfer senior women
into these positions, noted that nothing in the contract placed any limitation upon
assignment of women to these jobs. Moreover, the female grievant had performed the
job previously.
33. Chrysler Corp., 7 Lab. Arb. 386, 391 (1947) (Wolff, Arbitrator).
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limit for women under the California Labor Code).34  Consequently,
the employer violated the contract's bar on sex discrimination. A third
arbitrator held that the company could readily comply with the work-
ing conditions for females as set forth under a state industrial commis-
sion order (providing facilities for heating food for graveyard shift em-
ployees);35 the conditions could not be relied upon by the employer as
an excuse for discrimination against women since they did not "pro-
hibit" employment of females but rather only prescribed certain mini-
mal conditions to protect them. Only these few arbitrators were able
(and willing) to look behind the particular facts to distinguish the non-
application of the statutes to the situations at hand, yet these decisions
proved to be a forecast of things to come.
2. Post-Title VII Arbitration Decisions
The post-Title VII legal battles to eliminate sex discrimination
from protective legislation have most often focused on the allegation
that women are unable to do significant weight lifting or other related
work requiring "masculine physical prowess." In addition to the nu-
merous state laws placing arbitrary ceilings on the weight women em-
ployees may lift, there are many restrictions which have been established
by employers acting on their own initiative. Title VII, on the other
hand, provides that there should be no preferential treatment to any in-
dividual or group because of sex. 6 While some of its other provisions
expressly countenance preferential treatment for Indians3 7 and veter-
ans,38 there is no such provision regarding sexual preferences. Instead,
preferential treatment on the basis of sex would amount to reverse dis-
crimination, obviously illegal under language that an employer may not
"fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
34. Whittaker Controls & Guidance, 42 Lab. Arb. 938, 941 (1964) (Roberts,
35. U.S. Borax & Chem. Corp., 40 Lab. Arb. 916, 919 (1963) (Robert, Sanchez,
Long, Swain & Starkey, Arbitrators). In other cases, one arbitrator noted that the state
law had not been invoked against any employer for employing women in the enumer-
ated position, Ohio Steel Foundry Co., 5 Lab. Arb. 12 (1946) (Hampton, Arbitrator);
another concluded that the evidence presented did not clearly establish that the em-
ployment of women on the particular job would violate state law, Koehler Aircraft
Prods. Co., 32 Lab. Arb. 284 (1959) (Teple, Arbitrator); while a third noted that the
statute did not bar women from such jobs prior to the employer's unilateral change in
the plant's vacation relief system, Tee-Pak, Inc., 31 Lab. Arb. 160 (1958) (Fitzgerald,
Cleary & Joyce, Arbitrators).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1964).
37. Id. § 2000e-2(i).
38. Id. § 2000e-11.
terms, conditions, or privilege of employment, because of such indi-
vidual's . . . sex . . ."I' In other words, under Title VII, a person
must neither be discriminated against nor be given preference merely
because of his or her sex, but rather must be treated as an individual.
This policy would seem to be in direct conflict with sex-discriminatory
protective legislation.
a. Decisions Striking Down Sex Discrimination
Certainly the trend in arbitral decisions has been to ignore tradi-
tional stereotypes and discriminatory protective legislation in favor of
assuming an individualized approach to contract interpretation.40 For
example, an arbitrator held in 1966 that a company violated the no-sex
bias provision in a contract when it refused to open up some "male"
jobs for bidding by women on layoff.4 The arbitrator, rejecting the
company's assertion that the jobs were beyond the physical capacities
of females, declared that women cannot be excluded as a class. Rather,
he felt that the no-sex bias provision in the contract, read in light
of Title VII, meant that women must be given an opportunity indi-
vidually to prove their own qualifications. Ruling that an employer
cannot arbitrarily hold women disqualified because of their sex, he
nevertheless recognized that an employer "has the right to condition
the assignment of females to hitherto all-male jobs upon their passing
of a medical or other examination."42  Such an examination must be
geared to determining "the individual employee's qualifications, skill,
and ability, including his or her physical ability to do the work." 3
In a 1967 case, a union, representing three females who claimed
they suffered physical pains from operating a "T-handle" machine,
sought to bar women as a class from being able to work at that job on
the basis that the job was too physically rigorous and emotionally try-
ing for women to perform.4" In effect, the union was resisting the
employer's attempt to comply with Title VII. Considering his role to
39. Id. § 2000e-2(a).
40. Title VII does not expressly supersede state legislation "other than any such
law which purports to require or permit the doing of any act which would be an unlaw-
ful employment practice under this subchapter." Id. § 2000e-7. Thus, in order for
state protective legislation to remain valid under a Title VII challenge that it permits or
requires an unlawful employment practice, the subject matter of the state statute must
be demonstrated to be a bfoq for that particular job.
41. International Paper Co., 47 Lab. Arb. 896 (1966) (Williams, Arbitrator).
42. Id. at 898.
43. Id.
44. Allen Mfg. Co., 49 Lab. Arb. 199 (1967) (Hogan, Arbitrator).
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be limited to that of interpreting the contract (and not the law), the
arbitrator still found the proposal to be discriminatory under a no-sex
bias provision in the contract since its effect would be to deny the "T-
handle" machine job to a senior female bidder who wanted and was
entitled to it.
The decision relied primarily on the testimony of a doctor who
serviced several plants in the company's area. He testified that he had
personally observed the job and saw no reason why women could not
perform it. Consequently, the arbitrator held that the job was not
shown to require "a man's physical strength or stamina or [contain]
distinctly male job characteristics."4 5 In order for the union to be suc-
cessful in its move to make the "T-handle" work an "all-male" job, the
arbitrator intimated that the union must prove that "the physical re-
quirements of the job itself were such as to warrant barring all female
employees, now and in the future, from the job."4 6
Relying heavily on Title VII and the EEOC guidelines, another
arbitrator held that a company improperly refused to assign female
employees to jobs requiring overtime work solely because the duties in-
volved pulling heavy carts for some distance.4 7 "Recognizing that the
Arbitrator's function is not to determine whether there is a violation of
Title VII,148 he nevertheless emphasized the EEOC guidelines' re-
quirement of individualized treatment" in deciding how to interpret
the no-sex bias provision in the contract. The company had contended
that "the [j]ob in its entirety was beyond the physical capabilities of
our female employees." Yet, the arbitrator observed that "[n]o testi-
mony was given as to the height, weight, general health, strength, past
work history, or in fact, any other matter" regarding the grievants.5"
Finding no magical formula for determining whether women can per-
form certain "heavy" tasks, he suggested that the company may have to
test each individual or institute a trial and error system. He also pointed
out that "'lifting" weight is not the same as 'pulling' weight,"51 and
thereby escaped any conflict between his award and protective law pro-
hibitions.
45. Id. at 202.
46. Id. at 201.
47. Richardson Co., 68-2 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 5199 (1968) (Wright, Arbi-
trator).
48. Id. at 5201.
49. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(a)(1)(ii) (1971).
50. 68-2 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards at 5200-01.
51. Id.
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b. Decisions Supporting State Protective Laws
But there have been other arbitration decisions involving lifting
in the post-Title VII period where women have been disqualified as a
group yet no discrimination was found. The protective law stereotype
was apparently an important consideration in each case. For example,
despite a union's request that females be given an opportunity to qualify
for a job, one arbitrator stated flatly that women are "not physically
able to perform such heavy work.
-52
Other arbitrators have reached similar results. One held that a
woman employee had been properly barred from a job classification
requiring heavy lifting, even though less lifting would be required at
the particular work station in question.53 He pointed out that the job
description required this employee to be ready and able to work at any
station. Moreover, this essentially "male" position had been estab-
lished several years earlier because the female operators at that time
could not lift the pans containing parts to maintain uninterrupted op-
erations.
In another case, a layoff plan was upheld in which junior males
continued working in so-called heavy tasks while senior females
were laid-off.54 Since Title VII had been incorporated into the new
contract, the arbitrator felt that it was proper for him to turn to Title
VII and the EEOC guidelines for guidance in determining the mean-
ing of a contract clause banning sex discrimination, although Title VII
was not, in his opinion, to be applied "with strict literalness, but rather
in the light of reason and practicality."5 5 Under the layoff procedure
in question, women employees were laid-off completely rather than
being assigned (as their seniority and qualifications permitted) to a
general labor pool (an "all-male" classification) at the steel mill. The
arbitrator observed, without explaining his basis in fact, that only ex-
ceptionally strong women could perform the heavy tasks in the gen-
eral labor pool. He noted that so few women could qualify that, un-
der the EEOC guidelines, it would be unreasonable for the company
52. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 69-1 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 3961, 3962
(1968) (Goodman, Arbitrator). Basing his decision strictly on contract interpreta-
tion, the arbitrator concluded that the parties to the contract did not contemplate the
transfer of female employees to the meat boning deparment because of the physical
requirements.
53. Robertshaw Controls Co., 67-1 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 3220 (1967)
(Shister, Arbitrator).
54. Weirton Steel Co., 68-2 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 4683 (1968) (Kates, Ar-
bitrator).
55. Id. at 4687.
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to be forced into accepting a handful of women and having to estab-
lish and maintain separate restroom facilities for them as required by
state law. While his conclusion about separate facilities could be true,
nevertheless his premise that so few could qualify is valid only when
(as here) Title VII's requirement that women be given an opportunity
is ignored.
c. The Weeks and Bowe Cases
Soon after these decisions, two federal courts made key pro-
nouncements which have served as the basis for subsequent interpre-
tations of Title VIl's bfoq exemption. The first came on March 4,
1969 when the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Weeks v.
Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co.,56 launched an attack on
state weight lifting protective legislation. Determining that the legis-
lative history of Title VII indicates that the bfoq exemption for sex was
intended to be "narrowly construed,"5 7 the court ruled that:
[I]n order to rely on the bona fide occupational qualification ex-
ception an employer has the burden of proving that he had reason-
able cause to believe, that is, a factual basis for believing, that all
or substantially all women would be unable to perform safely and
efficiently the duties of the job involved.58
The court concluded that the employer had not met that burden here,
since it "introduced no evidence concerning the lifting abilities of
women. 59  Rejecting the company's stereotyped characterization that
women generally cannot do heavy lifting, the court mused: "Labeling
a job 'strenuous' simply does not meet the burden of proving that the
job is within the bona fide occupational qualification exception." 60
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit made a similar hold-
ing in Bowe v. Colgate Palmolive Co. 61 Although there was no state
protective law involved, the company had imposed its own thirty-five
pound weight-lifting limit on jobs open to women based upon its gen-
eral analysis of weight-lifting abilities of women. The court noted with
approval the EEOC's decision stating that Title VII prohibits "'stereo-
typed characterization of the sexes' [which precludes] consideration of
individual capacities as to physical strength and particular job require-
ments," and, consequently, that consideration must be given to women
56. 408 F.2d 228, 232-33 (5th Cir. 1969).
57. Id. at 232.
58. Id. at 235.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 234.
61. 416 F.2d 711, 718 (7th Cir. 1969).
applicants "on a highly individualized basis."62  Recognizing that the
type, frequency, and duration of lifting can increase the degree of exer-
tion and consequently diminish the number of women capable of per-
forming heavy lifting, the court held that the company could retain a
thirty-five pound weight-lifting requirement "as a general guideline for
all of its employees, male and female."6 3  The company was required
to notify all employees of openings on jobs requiring heavy lifting. Any
employee who could "demonstrate his or her ability to perform more
strenuous jobs on a regular basis" had to be allowed to "bid on and fill
any position to which his or her seniority may entitle him or her."
'64
A federal district court,6" relying on Bowe, went even further.
It determined that sex was not a bfoq for a job requiring the lifting of
sixty pounds, even though "on the average, men can perform these
tasks somewhat more efficiently and perhaps somewhat more safely
than women.""
Additional qualifications have been made in other areas of state
protective legislation. One court, while invalidating an hours limita-
tion because of women being denied the economic opportunity of over-
time work, recognized also that maximum hours laws discriminate
against men, since employers are forced by state law to impose the
burdens of overtime work primarily on their male employees. 67  An-
other court, denying a motion to dismiss the complaint, rejected an em-
ployer's twin assertions, ruling instead that males have standing to
claim sex discrimination under Title VII and that a few female plain-
tiffs have standing to challenge a law designed as protection for women
as a class.68
The EEOC, reversing its earlier stance, 69 has now assumed in its
62. Id. at 717-18, citing EEOC Decision No. AU68-10-209E (1968).
63. Id. at 718 (emphasis added).
64. Id.
65. Cheatwood v. South Cent. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 303 F. Supp. 754 (M.D.
Ala. 1969).
66. Id. at 759.
67. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Grabiec, 317 F. Supp. 1304, 1306 (S.D. Ill. 1970).
See also Bowe v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969); Sail'er Inn,
Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971), where the court
characterized all sex discrimination as invidious discrimination under the equal protec-
tion clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
68. Utility Workers Local 246 v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., [1969-1970 Transfer
Binder] CCH EMP. PPc. GUIDE 9369 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
69. The EEOC's original guidelines, issued in 1965, merely questioned whether
state protective legislation was still relevant in our modem technology. 30 Fed. Reg.
14927 (1965).
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amended guidelines the more extreme position that state protective
legislation does not take into account "the capacities, preferences, and
abilities of individual females and tend to discriminate rather than pro-
tect."'70 Accordingly, the EEOC will not consider state protective leg-
islation "a defense to an otherwise established unlawful employment
practice or as a basis for the application of the bona fide occupational
exception."''7 The EEOC's position, for example, is that a women's
maximum hours law "presumably is predicated on the belief that
women as a class are genetically incapable of safely working the same
number of hours as males."' 72 In one case it held that "sex is not a bona
fide qualification for occupations involving ten or more work hours in
a single day where . . . sex is not likewise a bona fide qualification
during regular hours for those occupations,"73 and, in another case,
that "sex is not a bona fide qualification for jobs requiring the lifting of
weights."'74 Before reaching such a decision on a particular law, how-
ever, the EEOC confers with appropriate state authorities to determine
whether the present effect of state protective legislation is protective
or discriminatory.75 All such laws examined by the EEOC to date
have been found to have a discriminatory effect.
d. Decisions After Weeks and Bowe
Yet even after Bowe and Weeks, some arbitrators have avoided
the individualized approach. One case held that frequent heavy lifting
can be a legal bar to a woman attempting to bid into "male' jobs.
76
The arbitrator found that the grievant was not able to perform all of
the physically heavy duties in the job classification. He noted, for ex-
ample, that whenever "X" department (all female) and "Y" depart-
ment (all male) employees have worked side-by-side and heavy physi-
cal work was required, "the woman stood aside while the man per-
formed it."7 7  Recognizing that "Y" department employees rarely
would have to perform all of these heavy operations in one day or even
in a month, he nevertheless was satisfied with the company's contention
that a woman in "Y" department "would have to be assignable to any
of these duties or else this needed flexibility and efficiency would be
70. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(b)(2) (1971).
71. Id.
72. EEOC Case No. VAL 9-023, CCH EMP. PRAc. GUIDE [ 6032, at 4058 (1969).
73. Id.
74. EEOC Decision No. 70-03, CCH EMP. PRAc. GUIDE 6053, at 4088 (1969).
75. EEOC Case No. YSF 9-056, CCH EMp. PRAc. GUIDE 6014 (1969).
76. Eastex, Inc., 70-2 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 5109 (1970) (White, Arbitrator).
77. Id. at 5110.
impaired." He took the position that "if an employee cannot perform
all the duties of a classification, a company has no obligation to let
such employee bump into it."
'7 8
On the other hand, disqualifications have generally been on the
basis of an individual lacking the requisite qualifications. In uphold-
ing the denial of a senior woman's bid, one arbitrator stressed the physi-
cal comparisons between the individual female and male applicants.7 9
The senior female was only five feet tall and weighed 115 pounds,
while the junior male was five feet nine and weighed 175 pounds.
Both had been probationary employees, but the male was awarded a
permanent job while the female was transferred to a lower-paying job.
The record showed that, while working as a probationary employee,
the female could not perform several duties or had difficulty in doing
them beyond the bare minimal level of operation. For example, she
was unable to push the hand truck into place without assistance and
was unable to see gauges for maneuvering the handles through the
machine. On the other hand, the male was capable of satisfactorily
performing all of the job duties, including those the female could
not. Noting that the contract provided for the most senior of rela-
tively equally qualified bidders to receive the job, the arbitrator held
that the company must "reasonably" exercise its rights under the con-
tract "to consider and determine the qualifications and abilities of the
employees involved."8 ° He continued: "If the grievant had been the
only bidder for the job or had qualifications and abilities relatively
equal or superior to another bidder, the Company would have been
obligated to accept such a bid on a trial basis . . ." otherwise, her re-
jection "would have been based solely on the supposition of incapa-
bility."8'
Recent judicial, administrative, and arbitral decisions indicate that
this issue of legitimate qualification standards is still far from settled.
Cases involving the Ohio weight lifting law are an excellent example.
The Ohio Industrial Relations Director suspended enforcement of
Ohio's multifarious protective laws8 2 on September 24, 1969, follow-
ing a series of EEOC decisions that those laws conflicted with Title VII
78. Id. at 5111.
79. Union Fork & Hoe Co., 70-2 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 5400 (1970) (Kindig,
Arbitrator).
80. Id. at 5402.
81. Id. at 5402-03.
82. OHio REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4107.42-.53 (Page, 1965), as amended, id. §§
4107.40, .44, .53 (Page Supp. 1970).
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and federal case law.83  Ohio's protective laws were being challenged
at that time in no less than eight Title VII cases in federal district
courts.
8 4
Arbitrators had been relying upon the Ohio weight lifting law to
deny grievances by females seeking employment, promotion, or recall
from layoff. One arbitrator observed, for example, that even if the fe-
male employees had possessed the physical ability to perform the re-
quired lifting, they would have been forbidden to do so by state law. 5
Another said that the company "is fully justified in taking the . . .
Ohio law into account."'86 He continued, declaring that an arbitrator
"cannot properly make an award which would require the company
to take action likely to result in a violation of the state law, unless it is
the only alternative which the contract itself clearly and specifically
presents."8"
Other arbitrators in Ohio were relying on the original EEOC
guidelines, which countenanced state lifting laws (as a bfoq) as long
as the standards were not set unreasonably low.88 However, this par-
ticular guideline was invalidated by a federal district court in California
on November 22, 1968. 89 The EEOC subsequently issued its present
guideline provision, instructing that state protective legislation will not
be considered as the basis for application of the bfoq exemption. 90
One exception was an arbitration award which upheld the griev-
83. E.g., EEOC Case Nos. CL 7-5-604 to -638 (1969), cited in CCH EMS'.
PRAc. GumE 5027, at 3677 n.18 (1970).
84. Testimony of Sonia Pressman, Senior Attorney of Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Council, at a hearing of the Commerce and Labor Committee of the Ohio House
of Representatives, Jan. 28, 1970, in CCH E P. PRAc. GUIDE ff 5027, at 3677 (1970).
These federal cases culminated in the federal district court decision of Ridinger v.
General Motors Corp., 325 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D. Ohio 1971), discussed at text ac-
companying notes 98-99 infra.
85. Schaefer Super Markets, Inc., 66-1 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 3920, 3924
(1966) (Geissinger, Arbitrator).
86. General Fireproofing Co., 67-1 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 3809, 3814 (1967)
(Teple, Arbitrator).
87. Id.
88. "[Restrictions on lifting weights will not be deemed in conflict with Title
VII except where the limit is set at an unreasonably low level which could not en-
danger women." 30 Fed. Reg. 14927 (1965). Arbitrations in which these guidelines
were relied upon include: Goodyear Aerospace Corp., 68-2 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards
5077 (1968) (Lehoczky, Arbitrator); Frito Lay, Inc., 66-3 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards
6046 (1966) (Stouffer, Arbitrator); Schaefer Super Markets, Inc., 66-1 CCH Lab.
Arb. Awards 3920 (1966) (Geissinger, Arbitrator).
89. Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 293 F. Supp. 1219 (C.D. Cal. 1968), aff'd,
444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971).
90. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(b)(2) (1971).
ance of senior female employees who charged that they were entitled to
pay for the time worked by junior males, even though the employer had
relied on the state lifting law limit to preclude the females' bid. 1  The
arbitrator relied on an EEOC bulletin, which read: "An employer
must seek all available administrative exceptions to state protective leg-
islation before relying on such laws as a basis for unequal treatment of
female employees."92  In addition to awarding back pay to the griev-
ants for the two positions in question, the arbitrator ordered the com-
pany to request the Ohio Department of Industrial Relations "to make
an evaluation of all jobs" worked by junior males while senior female
grievants were laid off.93 The other female grievants were to be paid
the regular wages for any of these jobs that could have been legally
done by senior females who had been improperly laid off instead. In
other words, the arbitrator merely found that the company had im-
properly failed to seek administrative exemptions under the state
weightlifting law; he did not seek to skirt the state law itself.
Nevertheless, the Ohio lifting law was still considered a defense to
a charge of sex discrimination after Weeks and the amended EEOC
guidelines. In one case,94 an arbitrator noted that, while the contract
required that all federal and state laws be adhered to, the state lifting
law was still valid since any conflicts between it and Title VII had not
been resolved. He nevertheless recognized that the law's twenty-five
pound lifting limit may have been too low, and that other vague stand-
ards in the state lifting law (e.g., "frequent or repeated lifting") needed
clarification.
At this juncture in the story of Ohio industrial jurisprudence, state
administrative officials announced that the Ohio lifting law would no
longer be enforced while court suits were pending. Subsequently, an
arbitrator set aside a woman's layoff by an Ohio company. 95 He ob-
served that "it would be an empty gesture to say that the [state lifting]
law now retains the same status as a controlling factor that it had prior
to the passage of the Federal Act."96  Thus, since there were serious
doubts about the validity of the state law, he ruled that the state lifting
law would not bar the company's following the clear terms of the con-
91. Alsco, Inc., 67-2 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 4304 (1967) (Altrock, Arbitrator).
92. Id. at 4309.
93. Id.
94. Canton Provision Co., 69-2 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 5244 (1969) (Altrock,
Arbitrator).
95. Gross Distributing, Inc., 71-1 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 3050 (1970) (All-
man, Arbitrator).
96. Id. at 3053.
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tract (which declared that seniority was to be determined by the length
of continuous service, with regard to the individual's experience and
ability to perform the work).
To further complicate the situation for Ohio arbitrators, the same
Ohio lifting law was both upheld by a state court9 7 and voided by a fed-
eral court 98 in a two-week span in March of 1971! The federal court
reasoned that the law was invalid under the principle of federal suprem-
acy since Title VII demands "that individuals be considered on the
basis of their individual capabilities and not on the basis of any char-
acteristics generally attributable to a group." 99  In contrast, the state
court observed:
While it is possible that such [a lifting] prohibition may be un-
reasonable as applied to some specific female employee, that
question is not before the court but, rather, the question is whether
or not the prohibition is unreasonable as applied to female em-
ployees generally." 100
The Ohio court concluded that such prohibitions could reasonably be
applied to women generally.
3. A Possible Solution
A better approach to the conflict between Title VII and state pro-
tective laws seems to be that followed in 1969 by an arbitrator inter-
preting the controversial effect of an Illinois maximum hours for
women law (after both Weeks and the amended EEOC guidelines). 1°1
In that case, the company had refused a female grievant's bid on a job
requiring overtime. The union contended that the company was re-
quired by the no-sex bias clause in the contract to tailor the job to al-
low women to be promoted by doing away with the overtime require-
ment for women. The union's approach was rejected by the arbitrator
on the theory that to do away with the overtime requirement only for
women would violate the no-sex bias clause in the contract since it
banned discrimination against any employee (male or female). Ra-
ther, he recognized that the real issue "involves a conflict between the
federal and state law; and the role of an arbitrator is a determination of
97. Jones Metal Prods. Co. v. Walker, 25 Ohio App. 2d 141, 267 N.E.2d 814
(1971).
98. Ridinger v. General Motors Corp., 325 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D. Ohio 1971).
99. Id. at 1096.
100. 25 Ohio App. 2d at -, 267 N.E.2d at 820.
101. Simoniz Co., 70-1 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 3092 (1969) (Howlett, Ar-
bitrator).
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that conflict. ' 0 2 He was of the opinion that "contracts include all law
applicable thereto, hence the arbitrator should apply the law (consti-
tutional, statute, and common) to each collective bargaining agree-
ment," and that, as an arbitrator, he "should apply the law," and that
any conflicts "between federal and state law must be resolved in favor
of federal law." '' 1
This arbitrator took what appears to have been the most realistic
approach to the role of arbitration. He concluded:
I recognize that my Award may cause Simoniz some legal
difficulties. Simoniz may follow one of two courses. It may
refuse to comply with the Award in which event Local 559 may
seek compliance in either a federal or state court. The Court
will then determine whether my interpretation of the law is cor-
rect, and whether federal or state law will apply.
In the alternative, Simoniz may comply with the Award. In
this event, the Illinois Department of Labor may charge Simoniz
with breach of the Illinois statute-if the Illinois Department of
Labor adheres to its previous opinion that the statute is applic-
able to Line Operators at the Simoniz plant. Simoniz may de-
fend on the basis of the Civil Rights Act.104
The Illinois female maximum hours law was subsequently invalidated
by a federal district court in a case involving another company.1"5
Generally, state administrative officials have been reluctant to ac-
cept federal court rulings. Many states, for example, appear to be fol-
lowing a "wait-and-see" approach, enforcing their local regulations un-
til a federal court holds that their specific regulations are invalid.' 6
Moreover, the attorney generals in two states have issued restrictive
opinions that Title VII supersedes the state protective legislation in their
respective states only as to those employers covered by Title VII, thus
leaving those employers exempted under Title VII still subject to state
102. Id. at 3095.
103. Id. at 3095-96.
104. Id. at 3098.
105. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Grabiec, 317 F. Supp. 1304 (S.D. I1. 1970).
106. "[U]ntil the Supreme Court of the United States rules otherwise, Kentucky
Protective Statutes . . . serve a legitimate purpose ...... KY. Op. Ar-r'y GEN. (June
26, 1969) in CCH EMp. PRAc. GUIDE 5079, at 3781-82; accord N.C. Op. OF COMM'R
OF LABOR (Nov. 25, 1969), af'g N.C. Op. ATT'y GEN. (Oct. 9, 1967) in CCH EMP.
PRAc. GUIDE 5111 and [1965-1968 Transfer Binder] CCH EMP. PR.c. GUIDE 8186.
Other states, with attorney general opinions upholding their respective protective legisla-
tion in 1966 or 1967, have not officially re-examined their protective laws in light of
recent federal decisions. See MD. Op. Arr'y GEN. (Jan. 19, 1966) in [1965-1968 Trans-
fer Binder] CCH EMP. PRAc. GUIDE 8044; 1967 Mo. Op. ATr'y GEN. No. 45 in
[1965-1968 Transfer Binder] CCH EMP. GUIDE 8136.
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protective laws.
10 7
In contrast, a few states have repealed their protective legisla-
tion; 08 attorney general opinions in two other states have held that
Title VII supersedes their protective laws; 0 9 and another attorney gen-
eral's opinion has added a further protection by ruling that the state




Job testing is another area in which Title VII has had an in-
creasing impact. An employer cannot establish new, spurious quali-
fications or tests in order to disqualify an unwanted applicant from the
"opposite" sex. If there previously were no standards for job appli-
cants, an employer's initiation of strict standards that disqualify an ap-
plicant (as well as a disproportionate number of other members of that
same sex) will be closely scrutinized.
1. Aptitude Tests
The United States Supreme Court recently ruled (in a race bias
case) that aptitude tests must be job related."' But even if a pre-em-
ployment test is job related, it is often quite subjective with ample op-
107. 1969 MicH. Op. A'rr'y GEN. No. 4687 in CCII EMP. PRAc. GUIDE 5108;
1970 WAsH. Op. ATrry GEN. No. 9 in CCH EMP. PR~c. GurE f 5073.
108. For example, the Arizona law limiting female working hours to eight per
day and forty-eight per week was repealed following an administrative determination
by the Arizona Civil Rights Commission on December 2, 1966, that the law violated
both Title VII and the state's FEP law. Ariz. Laws, 1970, ch. 69, § 1. The Georgia
law restricting weight lifting by female employees to thirty pounds was repealed while
the appeal to the Court of Appeals was pending in Weeks.
109. 1969 OXiLA. Op. ATY GEN. No. 69-304 in CCH EMP. PRAc. GUmE 5105;
S.D. Op. Arr'y GEN. (Feb. 27, 1969) in [1968-1969 Transfer Binder] CCII EM?. PRAc.
GumE 1 8080.
110. The state FEP ban on sex discrimination in 1969 "eliminates the need
and justification for preferential treatment in the field of employment because of sex
by placing males and females on an equal footing." PA. Op. ArT'y GEN. (Nov. 14,
1969) in CCH EM". PRAc. GumE 5106. Contra, 1969 MIcH. Op. Ar'y GEN. No.
4687 in CCII EM?. PRAc. GuiDE 1 5108 (state protective legislation specifically not
repealed in Michigan FEP law: "Any such refusal to hire or discrimination shall not
be an unfair employment practice if based on law, regulation .... ") and 1967 Mo.
Op. Arr'y GEN. No. 82 in [1965-1968 Transfer Binder] CCH EMP. PRAc. GUIME
8133.
111. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). In other words, the
Court determined that a test designed to measure skills not related to job performance
violates the Title VII ban on race discrimination whenever it is shown that the dis-
criminatory test had a greater disparate effect on blacks than on whites. This prin-
portunity for abuse. For example, an employer could stage a rigged
experiment to demonstrate dramatically that members of one sex can-
not perform the duties of a job classification filled exclusively by mem-
bers of the other sex either: (1) by unfairly matching the most ex-
perienced employee in a sex-segregated job classification with an inex-
perienced (or the smallest or weakest or least mechanically inclined)
member of the opposite sex; or (2) by intentionally fouling up the
performance of one party by providing inferior tools (such as dull bits
for a woman attempting to become a drill pressman).
Just such a situation of biased administration of qualification test-
ing was presented in a 1947 arbitration (long before the passage of
Title VII) in which the employer was ordered to rescind his discharge
of women who had not been given a fair trial on a job.1 ' The em-
ployer appeared to have applied stricter standards to the female griev-
ant than to male workers trying out for the same job. Moreover, the
evidence indicated that the job was well within her qualifications and
that her employment record cast considerable doubt on the employer's
claim that she was careless and indifferent.
Arbitrators do not interfere when employers exercise their man-
agement right to determine ability and qualifications of employees
"fairly and in good faith and without a clear mistake.""' 3  Tests to de-
termine an applicant's ability have become commonplace, with one
analyst pointing out:
It is well established by now that tests to aid in the determination
of whether applicants possess the qualifications for a particular
job may be given where (1) they are reasonably related to the
requirements of the job, (2) they are fairly and uniformly ad-
ministered, (3) they are considered along with all other relevant
evidence of qualifications, and (4) they are not given prominence
out of proportion to other evidence which indicates a contrary
view."1
4
One arbitration in point involved a contention by female em-
ployees that their union had improperly failed to press their grievance
against a company after they were laid off upon failure to pass a pro-
ficiency test." 5 The company had a contract with NASA, which in-
ciple would appear to apply also to sex bias, since the effect on a discriminatorily-
designed, non-job related test could be to effectively screen out most women on the
basis of general lack of specialized mechanical knowledge which the job itself would
not require.
112. Chrysler Corp., 8 Lab. Arb. 611 (1947) (Wolff, Arbitrator).
113. CCH LAB. L. REP., UNION CONT. ARB. 58,538, at 84,113 (1969).
114. Id. at 84,112-13.
115. McKnight, 66-3 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 5815, 5816 (1966) (United Auto
Workers Public Review Board).
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sisted that any soldering work by a contractee company be done only
by employees who could demonstrate a stated minimum level of skill.
The union got the company to provide fifty-six hours of specialized
training for all current employees in a soldering classification, but all
of the women nevertheless failed the test. Subsequently, the union
chose not to press the grievance that the test was unnecessary, preferring
instead to work amicably with the company to provide for further train-
ing and subsequent retesting of women employees. The union review
board vindicated the union since, had the union immediately pressed
the grievances, through arbitration, the grievants would have been "out
for good" being unable at that time to pass the test.116 Regarding
the test itself, the arbitrator stated that the union could not maintain
that the company has no right to demand a certain level of skill of its
employees.
117
One aspect of the testing procedure which the arbitrator glossed
over was the grievants' charge that all employees in the department
"were required to qualify as certified solderers even though some
did no soldering whatsoever in their daily work."'1' 8  This test for
employees not doing any soldering certainly does not appear to have
been job related.
There have been a few other arbitrations in point. In 1969, an
arbitrator held that it was not a discriminatory exercise of manage-
ment's judgment to refuse to give a female grievant a trial on the job for
which she was bidding.1 9 The contract stated that the senior em-
ployee was to receive a trial period on a job if he or she was "qualified."
The arbitrator interpreted "if qualified" to mean that "the senior em-
ployee must have a background of such training, experience, or dem-
onstrated aptitude and physical makeup, as to give a reasonable person
cause to believe that this person can be expected to perform the job
competently within a reasonable time."' 0  The evidence showed that
the female grievant had no experience whatsoever in several critical
functions of the job, whereas the less senior male (who got the job)
had extensive experience with such work. Thus, grievant's lack of ex-
perience rendered her unqualified for the job.
A similar position was taken in 1970 by another arbitrator who
116. Id.
117. Id. at 5817.
118. Id. at 5816.
119. Kingsberry Homes Corp., 70-1 CCH Lab, Arb. Awards 3577 (1969)
(Rauch, Arbitrator).
120. Id. at 3579.
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upheld the layoff of three senior male plant guards while three part-
time junior female guardettes were retained.12' Guards were patrol-
men, while guardettes primarily performed clerical duties but also per-
formed guard-related duties. The male grievants argued that the sen-
iority provision in the contract should be interpreted as requiring that
senior male guards be permitted to transfer to female guardette posi-
tions (thus bumping junior female guardettes) rather than being laid
off (while junior female guardettes were retained). Rejecting this
claim, the arbitrator noted that only one of the three male grievants in-
dicated an ability to do the work of a guardette (which was mostly
clerical in nature), and it was evident that the one making the claim
lacked the necessary clerical training.
On the other hand, this arbitrator held in the same case that it
was improper for the company to fail to recall two senior men from
layoff before hiring two women for guardette positions. The contract
provided that employees on layoff were to be recalled for any jobs for
which they were qualified. The arbitrator held that these two male
grievants were capable of learning the work of a guardette, and so they
should have been recalled. Recognizing that the company normally as-
signed women to the position of guardette, the arbitrator determined
that the no-discrimination clause in the contract required the company
to consider all qualified employees (including men).
2. Physical Examinations
Another common requirement of applicants for employment (es-
pecially for blue-collar jobs) is a physical examination. This has been
considered a proper exercise of managerial rights (under a standard
"Management Clause") "to make sure that its employees are not af-
flicted with any physical limitation or impairment which may adversely
affect their health and safety or those of their fellow workers."'
1 22
Two arbitral awards in 1966 upheld, against claims of sex bias,
a policy of requiring female, but not male, applicants for jobs to submit
to physical examinations. One of the arbitrators recognized that "fe-
males as a group do not possess the strength and vigor of males and
require greater protection against individual risks and hazard than do
males."'1 23  "Hence," he continued, "an employer has the right to con-
121. Wackenhut Corp., 70-2 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 4766 (1970) (Vadakin,
Arbitrator).
122. Olin Corp., 70-2 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 5876, 5881 (1970) (Anrod, Ar-
bitrator).
123. International Paper Co., 47 Lab. Arb. 896, 898 (1966) (R. Williams, Ar-
bitrator), citing Sperry-Rand Corp., 46 Lab. Arb. 961 (1966) (Seitz, Arbitrator).
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dition the assignment of females to hitherto all-male jobs upon their
passing of a medical or other examination.' 124  The second arbitrator,
indulging the same presumption, determined that "it is appropriate,
when the job calls for greater strength and vigor, to condition assign-
ment of females upon passing medical examinations.' 1 25  In both
cases, the jobs involved somewhat heavy work.
Both arbitrators added, however, that employers could not merely
bypass women for heavy jobs without permitting them to qualify
through medical examinations (and performance tests). Referring to
Title VII, the first arbitrator said that the employer "cannot arbitrarily
hold them disqualified because they are women";126 the second, with-
out mentioning Title VII, said that the no-sex bias clause in the con-
tract meant that "the Company cannot select one [of two applicants
for a job] because he is male and reject the other because she is fe-
male.'
2 7
A sex-based difference in the timing of physical examinations has
been held by the EEOC to violate Title VII. 12  Male production em-
ployees were given back x-rays as part of their entrance physical ex-
aminations, while female production employees were not given back
x-rays unless and until they later bid on "heavy" (male) jobs. The
EEOC determined that while it was "not unreasonable" for women em-
ployees to be required to have back x-rays before they could be as-
signed to jobs involving heavy lifting, such x-rays must be given to
women at the same time they are given to men in conformance with
the requirements of Bowe. 29  Otherwise, a male employee "at the
time he was hired . . . could predict with more confidence than a
newly hired female employee whether or not certain positions would be
foreclosed to him in the future because of his health."'' 03
Physical examinations have also lent themselves to discrimination
on the basis of sex-based differences in physical makeup. Height and
weight restrictions are good examples since men on the average are
considerably taller and heavier than women and the requirements often
have little or nothing to do with job performance. The unfairness of
such policies was recognized by a state appellate court upholding a
124. Id.
125. Sperry-Rand Corp., 46 Lab. Arb. 961, 965 (1966) (Seitz, Arbitrator).
126. 47 Lab. Arb. at 898.
127. 46 Lab. Arb. at 964.
128. EEOC Decision No: 71-1332, CCH Emp. PR~c. GUIME f 6212 (Mar. 2, 1971).
129. Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
130. CCH EMx. PRc. GuiDE at 4362.
New York State Human Rights Commission decision that sex discrimi-
nation resulted from a baseball league's rule requiring an umpire to be
at least five feet ten inches tall and no less than 170 pounds.13 ' The
appeals court said: "While undoubtedly height and weight are impor-
tant in judging a person's ability to withstand physical strain, it has not
been demonstrated that persons 5' 10" and over are the only people
capable of withstanding such strain,"'132 especially in light of evidence
that there have been umpires in the past who didn't meet these stand-
ards.
Similarly, the EEOC has stated: "Where, as here, an employ-
ment policy has a foreseeable disproportionate impact upon members
of a group protected by Title VII, the employer must show that the
policy is so necessary to the safe and efficient operation of his business
as to justify the policy's discriminatory effects."' 33  Noting that the
employer did not attempt to show a business necessity for its rule re-
quiring a minimum height of five feet six inches for persons in pro-
duction jobs, the EEOC cited the Statistical Abstract figures as to rela-
tive heights of men and women.' 34
Arbitrators have not been presented with sex discrimination
cases involving bogus physical requirements. However, an arbitrator
(in a case not involving sex bias issues) has construed contract pro-
visions on "qualifications" in relation to "capabilities to perform the
job."'1 35  Accordingly, he noted that the company "could not validly
specify a minimum six-foot height or a maximum 150-pound weight
for each applicant for a posted job unless such height and weight have
a reasonable relationship to the necessary capabilities to perform the
particular job to be filled.'1
3 6
131. New York State Div. of Human Rights v. New York-Pennsylvania Profes-
sional Baseball League, 36 App. Div. 2d 364, 320 N.Y.S.2d 788 (1971).
132. Id. at 369, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 794.
133. EEOC Decision No. 71-1529, CCH EMP. PRAc. GutmE 6231, at 4411 (Apr.
2, 1971).
134. Id. The EEOC, in an earlier racial discrimination case, had noted in dictum
that if a company's height requirements "serve to screen out qualified females" then
Title VII is violated. In the particular case, the EEOC determined that the height
requirements applied only to females and also that several women of lesser height
(who had been hired prior to the promulgation of the minimum height rule) were
satisfactorily performing the job on which complainant was bidding. EEOC Case No.
YCL 9-006, CCH EMp. PRAC. GUmE 6093, at 4142 (1969).
135. Ball Bros. Co., 66-2 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 5097 (1966) (Kates, Arbi-
trator).
136. Id. at 5100.
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C. Marital Status
Another frequent sex-based employment practice is the disquali-
fication of married applicants or employees. Title VII does not
expressly bar discrimination on the basis of marital status; nor does any
state FEP law except New Jersey's. 137  Thus, a blanket ban on mar-
ried employees, which is applied to both sexes, is not an illegal em-
ployment practice except in New Jersey. In order for an employer's
policy to constitute sex discrimination under federal law, there must
first be a "no-marriage" policy applied to one sex but not to the other
and, second, a failure by an employer to establish that a "no-marriage"
policy applied to only one sex is a bfoq for that particular job.
Labor contract provisions banning discrimination on the basis
of an employee's marital status have not been common.1'8 For exam-
ple, a 1965 study of the incidence of antidiscrimination clauses in labor
contracts in Iowa one year after the passage of Title VII turned up
only one provision banning discrimination because of marital status in
the 153 labor contracts examined (as compared to 46 of the 153 con-
tracts containing a ban on sex discrimination generally).'3 9 Moreover,
a 1954 compilation of representative clauses from labor contracts not
only contained no provision banning marital status discrimination but
also listed two provisions patently discriminatory toward married
women.' 40  One read: "The company agrees not to hire nor continue
in employment married women, unless such married women have no
other means of support.' 4 ' The other read: "The company agrees to
adopt and maintain as a part of its labor policy that the marriage of
any female employee (hereafter employed) shall terminate her employ-
ment with the company."' 42
Contemporary labor contracts in the airline industry are another
example, having made single status a condition of employment, with
subsequent marriage considered cause for termination. The force of
such rules has fallen squarely on females, since the airlines' no-marriage
bans have been applied primarily to the predominately female flight
137. 10 NJ. Rv. STAT. § 5(12)(a) (Supp. 1970).
138. But see, e.g., the labor contract at the Rockwell Manufacturing Company:
"The policy of the Company, the Union and its local is not to discriminate against
any employee on account of... marital status .... " Rockwell Mfg. Co., 70-1 CCH
Lab. Arb. Awards 4124, 4125 (1970) (Duff, Arbitrator).
139. Wortman & Luthans, The Incidence of Antidiscrimination Clauses in Union
Contracts, 16 LABOR LJ. 523, 530 (1965).
140. COMmRCE CLrEARIG HOUSE, INC., UNION CONTRACT CLAUSES 764 (1954).
141. Id.
142. Id,
cabin attendant position (i.e., stewardesses and stewards) and have
been applied more rigorously against stewardesses than against simi-
larly-situated stewards.
The EEOC's position on marital status is that an employment pol-
icy adversely affecting married women, while not being applicable to
married men, constitutes sex discrimination in violation of Title VII.
The stated basis for this conclusion is not that a marriage restriction
itself violates Title VII but that the marriage restriction "is applied to
females and not to similarly placed males. 143  As enunciated in its
guidelines, the EEOC declares: "It does not seem to us relevant that
the rule is not directed against all females, but only against married fe-
males, for so long as sex is a factor in the application of the rule, such
application involves a discrimination based on sex."' 44  The EEOC
conceded, however, that there "may" be "certain circumstances" in
which such a rule "could be justified" as a bfoq.145 While it expressed
"no opinion on this question," the EEOC did point out that sex as a
bfoq cannot be justified on the basis of "a general principle such as the
desirability of spreading work."'146
The issue of sex discrimination because of marital status has not
yet reached the Supreme Court. The only court of appeals to rule on
the question is the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. It held, in
Lansdale v. Air Line Pilots Association International,4' that the dis-
trict court erred in dismissing a complaint alleging that the stewardesses'
union violated Title VII by, in the district court's words, "caus[ing] an
employer . . . to allow its [stewards] the privilege of marriage while de-
nying this same privilege to its [stewardesses] within the same classi-
fication."'14  The court of appeals determined that the district court
ruling would permit sex bias "without the requisite finding which must
support such a conclusion-that the same is a bona fide occupational
qualification."' 49  The airline-union agreements were deemed unlaw-
ful since they "aided, abetted, condoned and caused the unlawful em-
ployment practice of applying a different standard of compensation,
condition of employment between its female flight cabin attendants and
its male flight cabin attendants and other employees." 50
143. EEOC Case No. YSF9-060, CCH EMP. PRAC. GUiDE 6011, at 4031 (1969).
144. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.3(a) (1971).
145. Id.
146. Id. § 1604.3(b).
147. 430 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1971).
148. Id. at 1342.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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One pre-Title VII arbitral award held that discharge of female
employees solely because they were married was not discharge for
"proper cause."'' Noting that marriage was not a ground for dis-
charge of male employees, the arbitrator held that there is a basic prin-
ciple, in the absence of special provisions to the contrary, that all em-
ployees have equal rights under labor contracts.
Arbitration generally has not been of significant value in out-
rightly combatting sex discrimination on the basis of no-marriage poli-
cies. One system board of adjustment, charged with arbitration of
contract disputes in the airline industry, has stated, for example: "The
jurisdiction of this System Board does not extend to interpreting and
applying the Civil Rights Act."' 5 s  It has also said that "The Board
. . . derives its authority under the Contract and, therefore, limits its
discussion to its jurisdiction under it."'5 3
Most arbitrations have involved strictly contract interpretation,
with the question being whether the no-marriage ban was applicable
to the dispute at hand. However, one case squarely presented the sex
bias issue, since the airline in question terminated married stewardesses
but not married stewards.' 54 The system board, in upholding the fe-
male grievant's discharge because of her marriage as being for "just
cause," rationalized that the stewards were used only in the airline's
Hawaiian operation and were kept on separate seniority lists.' 55 Not-
ing that grievant was terminated under a long-established and consist-
ently administered policy of the company that the stewardesses' union
had acquiesced in, the board stated that its jurisdiction "does not ex-
tend to interpreting and applying the Civil Rights Act."'1 5 6 The board
noted that grievant had filed a complaint with the EEOC, and implied
that grievant's remedy for sex discrimination would have to be pursued
under Title VII rather than with the board.
One board of arbitration interpreted one airline's contract to
mean that the case of each stewardess must be considered and judged
by it in good faith on an individual basis, rather than authorizing a
151. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R., 11 Lab. Arb. 1062, 1065 (1948) (Seward,
Arbitrator).
152. United Air Lines, Inc., 67-1 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 3720, 3726 (1967)
(Kahn, Referee).
153. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 67-1 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 3854, 3857 (1967)
(Kelliher, Referee).
154. United Air Lines, Inc., 67-1 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 3720 (1967) (Kahn,
Referee).
155. Id. at 3727.
156. Id. at 3726.
blanket policy of automatic termination of all stewardesses upon their
marriage. 5 ' The contract read that the company "may, at its option,"
terminate stewardesses after six months of their marriage. 158  The
board noted that during the contract negotiations the parties had agreed
that the no-marriage policy as applied by the airline was a premature
measure used to discharge stewardesses who "[got] out of line," and
was not enforced merely because of a change in marital status.159 The
board, in effect, formalized company procedures by holding that a mar-
ried stewardess could be terminated because of her marital status, but
only upon a showing that her marital status interfered with the efficient
performance of her duties.
In two other cases in which the system board held that dis-
charges of married stewardesses were not for "just cause," the
board found that the marital ban was inserted into individual employ-
ment contracts notwithstanding the fact that the airline-union's con-
tract contained no such provision. In one of these cases, 60 the board
intimated that its failure to enforce the individual contracts was in-
fluenced by the recent passage of Title VII, which the board charac-
terized as representing "the modem trend of thought."'' The board
left it to the parties to negotiate regarding the point of marital bans in
its new contract, as they had by the time of this decision. The new
agreement gave the airline the option to terminate stewardesses after
six months of marriage (or upon pregnancy). The board was "im-
pressed" with this new agreement.' 62 Presumably, the board would
be willing to insist that the airline not use this provision to automatically
terminate all stewardesses upon their marriage without individual con-
sideration of what effect marriage had on the efficiency of each stew-
ardess' job performance. The board's short-sightedness regarding the
pregnancy issue is discussed in another section of this paper.
In the other case,'8 3 a board found that the no-marriage rule
was unreasonable on the theory that "[u]nreasonable restrictions upon
157. American Airlines, Inc., 67-1 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 4236 (1967) (Seitz,
Arbitrator).
158. Id. at 4237.
159. Id. at 4240, 4243.
160. Braniff Airways, Inc., 65-2 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 5434 (1965) (Gray,
Arbitrator).
161. Id. at 5435.
162. Id.
163. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 67-1 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 3854 (1967) (Kelli-
her, Referee).
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marriage are against public policy."'1 Noting that this airline had
no experience in employing married stewardesses, the board found that
despite the fact that several other airlines had employed married stew-
ardesses "there was no showing based on any industry study that mar-
ried Stewardesses have proved to be less dependable than unmarried
Stewardesses." 165  Characterizing the no-marriage policy as "unrea-
sonable," the board determined that the policy's "justification as a
safety measure is minimal" and that its "value as a sales promotion de-
vice is doubtful."1 6
D. Sexual Intimacy
The bfoq exemption has arisen most frequently in matters in-
volving sexual intimacy. This matter has yet to be adjudicated in the
courts, but decisions by the EEOC and by arbitrators have generally
taken a realistic approach to protect privacy and individual dignity.
1. Sex-Segregated Facilities
State regulations typically provide that an employer must provide
sex-segregated facilities for its employees. Most commonly this means
restrooms, but, depending on the nature of the job, it can also mean
berthing facilities as well as showers and locker rooms. Such regula-
tions obviously are valid under Title VII and state FEP laws. In this re-
gard, the EEOC general counsel has opined that Title VII applies only
to employee status and consequently has no effect on regulations re-
quiring separate rest rooms for men and women. Such regulations
are in the interest of public health or safety as well as community mor-
ality.16
7
Employers cannot, however, use the prohibitive cost of installing
separate "female" facilities as a smoke screen in refusing to hire their
first female employees. Rather, each situation must be based on its
individual facts. The EEOC guidelines state in this connection: "The
fact that the employer may have to provide separate facilities for a per-
son of the opposite sex will not justify discrimination under the [bfoq]
exception unless the expense would be clearly unreasonable."168 Thus,
a cost accounting analysis could be instrumental in determining what
164. Id. at 3857.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 3857-58.
167. EEOC Op. Gen. Counsel (Sept. 9, 1965), reported at CCH EMP. PRAC.
Gum 1219.43.
168. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(a)(1)(iv) (1971) (emphasis added).
is reasonable and what is unreasonable under particular circumstances.
The EEOC decisions to date have not dealt with the question of num-
ber quotas, but have turned instead on a finding that the employer was
not making a good faith attempt to provide the facilities.I69
Pre-Title VII arbitral awards accepted without question that state
"facilities" regulations excused discrimination against women. For ex-
ample, one arbitrator upheld an employer's refusal to recall female em-
ployees to foundry jobs after a state agency announced resumption of
enforcement of female protective regulations. 7 The arbitrator noted
that retention of the women would have necessitated the employer
making capital expenditures to provide certain safeguards (including
toilet facilities). Moreover, installation of these facilities would cause
interruption of the employer's manufacturing processes.
Carrying the excuse to an extreme, another employer removed all
toilet and locker room facilities for female employees as part of a large-
scale renovation of his physical plant. An arbitrator upheld the sup-
sequent discharge of all female employees (numbering four out of the
total of 125 employees), since they ceased to be "suitable" employees
after the renovation was completed. 17' The employer was considered
169. See, e.g., EEOC Decision No. 70-558, CCH EMP. PRc. GuIDE 6137
(1970). An employer offered the excuse that he would have to hire at least twenty to
twenty-five female welders to make installation of female rest rooms and locker
facilities "economically feasible." Id. However, the EEOC discovered that there had
been separate facilities during World War II when many females were employed and
that the main water and sewer lines still existed on the employer's premises. Thus,
the real question was the cost of the reinstallation of the facilities, and the existence of
the main water and sewer lines would spare the employer major cost factors.
The maritime industry has been the major battleground on the issue of separate
facilities. The EEOC has determined that (the male) sex is not a bfoq for crew
positions aboard passenger ships. EEOC Decision No. 70-375, CCH EMP. PRAc.
Guma 6081 (1969). Crew members on ships share cabins and bath facilities as a
matter of economics. The EEOC unsurprisingly characterized the ship companies'
policy of not berthing members of different sexes in the same cabins as being "a rea-
sonable qualification for crew members not married to one another." Id. at 4123.
Discounting management's reliance on Coast Guard regulations which declare "[W]here
practicable, crew spaces shall be located entirely separate and independent of spaces
allotted to passengers or licensed officers." 46 C.F.R. § 72.20-10(f) (1971) (empha-
sis added), the EEOC determined that those regulations do not preclude the making
of those reasonable efforts to accommodate female employees necessary for compli-
ance with Title VII. CCH EMP. PRAc. GUIDE 11 6081, at 4124. Accordingly, the
EEOC suggested that passenger staterooms on undersold voyages could be used as
emergency quarters "where otherwise practicable or reasonable." Id. However, the
EEOC did not require management to utilize passenger rooms for crew members on a
voyage that is fully booked. Id.
170. Cooper-Bessemer Corp., 25 Lab. Arb. 146 (1955) (Meredith, Arbitrator).
171. San Francisco Club Institute, 23 Lab. Arb. 454 (1954) (Wyckoff, Arbi-
trator).
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to have satisifed his requirement (under the contract) of using "good
judgment" in discharging employees, since the purpose of the renova-
tion was to obtain maximum utilization of limited space and increase
efficiency, and not to discriminate against female employees as such-" 2
Likewise, an arbitrator has recently ruled that Title VII, when
read in the light of "reason and practicality," does not require an em-
ployer to accept an otherwise qualified female applicant in an all-male
plant when it is clear that only a few other females could ever meet the
physical requirements of the job, i.e., unsuitable heavy labor."' Since
state law would require erection of seats for female employees as well
as separate restroom facilities, the arbitrator ruled that it would be un-
reasonable for the company to have to provide the required facilities
under these circumstances for so few. Unfortunately, no guidelines
were suggested as to how many qualified females would need to apply
within a period of time before an employer would no longer be justi-
fied in refusing to hire females on the basis of having to erect separate
facilities for them.
2. Restroom Attendant
One of the most commonly cited examples of a position in which
sex is a bfoq is that of a restroom attendant.' 74 However, every type of
restroom attendant does not automatically come within the bfoq excep-
tion-which under Weeks and the EEOC guidelines is to be inter-
preted narrowly. The one type of restroom attendant clearly coming
within the bfoq exception is that rarity in which the attendant provides
personal services for persons inside the restroom. The typical example
is a male stationed in a men's room in swanky establishments in
large metropolitan areas to dole out hand towels for a tip. Obvi-
ously, sex is a bfoq in this instance, since the attendant is stationed in-
side the restroom at all times.
Certain limitations have been placed on the bfoq exemption's ap-
plication to rest room attendants of a janitorial type, however. For ex-
ample, the EEOC has held that sex is not a bfoq for the position of a
lifeguard at a swimming pool, even though the duties included clean-
ing both the men's and women's locker rooms." 5
172. Id. at 455-56.
173. Weirton Steel Co., 68-2 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 4683, 4687 (1968) (Kates,
Arbitrator).
174. See, e.g., N.Y. Guidelines for Applying Sex Discrimination Law § D(1) (b),
in CCH EMP. PRAc. Gump- % 26,053 (1971).
175. EEOC Decision No. 70-286, CCH Ema,. PRAc. GUIDE 1 6077 (1968). The
hotel had refused to hire a female on the basis that most of the hotel's guests were
An arbitrator likewise refused to consider sex a per se bfoq for the
position of attendant for the opposite sex's locker room.17  However,
relying upon an EEOC booklet, he held in a significantly different
factual situation that sex is a bfoq for the janitorial position of locker
room attendant when the attendant's duties would have to be carried
out periodically during the day when the locker rooms would be in
regular use by patrons of the opposite sex. The locker room in ques-
tion was characterized as "an around-the-clock operation" in constant
use by male customers and employees during the regular working
hours. 177  Consequently, the arbitrator concluded that it would be an
unreasonable disruption of production to expect a female attend-
ant to step out every time a male wanted to use the male locker room,
since it certainly would be "a considerable violation of community
standards of morality or propriety to have a person of one sex using a
toilet or locker room while a person of the other sex was present.'
'1 78
Thus, he dismissed the female's grievance which charged that she had
improperly been denied the overtime assignment of cleaning the male
locker room during a holiday season. Her regular job was to clean
both the male and female locker rooms only on an after-hours basis.
The arbitrator went on, however, to say in dictum that the same stand-
ard must be applied to male attendants cleaning a locker room in
constant use by female employees. The clear implication in his arbi-
tral award was that while sex may be a bfoq for a restroom attendant
during the normal office hours it is not a bfoq when the same duties are
performed after the normal working hours when the restroom would
be used only infrequently.
3. Restroom Privileges
A company's rule requiring employees to punch in and out when
going to the restroom was considered by an arbitrator to be unreason-
able. 79  Pegging his decision on the policy constituting a trespass
males, and she obviously could not perform the necessary tasks of cleaning the male's
locker room. The EEOC's answer simply was: "It is obvious that, if a male can
clean the women's locker room, a female can clean the men's locker room."
176. Corn Products Co. Int'l, CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 4410 (1970) (Gross, Ar-
bitrator); accord, Hercules Powder Co., 45 Lab. Arb. 448 (1965) (Shafer, Arbitrator)
(women's restroom dirty during day until male janitor cleaned after hours; janitoress
replacement upheld).
177. 70-1 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards at 4413.
178. Id. at 4414.
179. Gremar Mfg. Co., 66-1 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 3008 (1965) (Teele, Ar-
bitrator).
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into areas of personal dignity, the arbitrator nevertheless discussed the
case in terms of the especially adverse impact of the rule upon women
employees. Concluding that special problems arose with females work-
ing under the close supervision of male foremen, he ordered the com-
pany to abolish this practice, notwithstanding company claims that the
policy was necessary for purposes of cost accounting. Any alternative
efficiency-oriented plan would require safeguards "to eliminate discrim-
ination, to protect the privacy of the individuals concerned, and to
avoid undue embarrassment to these individuals."180
4. Intimate Nursing Care
An arbitrator has ruled that a hospital does not violate Title VII
in refusing to permit male licensed vocational nurses (hereinafter
called nurses) to perform duties involving sensitive personal care of
female patients.1 s1 The hospital's policy was based upon its "assess-
ment of the proclivities of its female patients," to wit that some female
patients consider it "a highly offensive indignity" to be given sensitive
personal care by male nurses.' 82 By accepting the hospital's position
that it "must anticipate what those who must avail of nursing care in
its beds will be willing to tolerate,"' 8 the arbitrator thereby accepted
customer preference as a bfoq. This approach is contrary to the
EEOC Guidelines, but in line with the district court decision in the
Diaz case which was subsequently reversed.'8 "
Conceding that this approach was discriminatory against the male
nurses, the arbitrator maintained that a contrary decision would result
in discrimination against those female patients "subjected to the rou-
tine but unwanted ministrations of male [nurses]." Noting that dis-
crimination per se is not always improper, he declared that Title VII,
as well as the hospital's collective bargaining agreement with the
nurses, bars only invidious discrimination that reflects on the dignity
of those involved. Consequently, he felt that the hospital acted ap-
propriately in choosing to protect the personal privacy of female pa-
tients, even at the expense of maintaining discriminatory employment
practices against male nurses.
The arbitrator noted that in this particular situation there were
180. Id. at 3013.
181. Kaiser Foundation Hosps. & Servs. Employees, 67-2 Lab. Arb. Awards 4665
(1967) (Jones, Arbitrator).
182. Id. at 4670.
183. Id.
184. Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 559 (S.D. Fla.
1970), rev'd, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971), cert, denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3212 (1971).
other hospitals covered by this collective agreement in which there
would be a work mix not requiring intimate care of female patients,
and thus ordered the grievants to be reinstated as nurses. He sug-
gested furthermore that preferential treatment for male nurses would
be a proper consideration in making job assignments in other hospital
units not requiring intimate care of female patients.
The arbitrator's award countenanced assignment of nurses on the
basis of sex, a situation prohibited by Title VII if sex is not a bfoq for
the position, but he failed to deal squarely with the bfoq issue. He
did not mention the possibility of male patients' personal dignity being
offended when they are given sensitive personal care by female nurses.
The logical extension of the award would be that male patients can in-
sist on male nurses, and that assignments must be made accordingly.
Otherwise, there would be a double standard, which is surely unac-
ceptable.
I. Working Conditions
Closely related to the question of the bfoq exemption, which "ex-
cuses" otherwise illegal sex discrimination in hiring employees, is the
question of an employer applying sex-based differentials in the terms
or conditions of employment. As discussed earlier," 5 Title VII pro-
hibits preferential treatment on the basis of sex, and that is as true
concerning working conditions as it is with respect to qualifying for
employment. The EEOC guidelines do not cover working conditions
generally, but they do refer to specific situations (such as sex-based
differences in optional or compulsory retirement ages)., s6  The
EEOC's basic approach is that if, for example, employers provide spe-
cified lunch breaks and rest periods, then they must provide these con-
ditions to all of their similarly situated employees.187 Title VII would
be violated if a company provided breaks for employees of one sex but
not for those of the other.
Generally, arbitrators since 1965 have been especially mindful of
this Title VII proscription on preferential treatment for women. They
have been particularly critical of women attempting to skirt heavy lift-
ing duties. One arbitrator upheld the firing of a woman grievant
who had refused a work order to handle materials weighing sixty-eight
pounds and who claimed that it was "man's work."188  The record
185. See text accompanying notes 36-39 supra.
186. E.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1604.31(a) (1970).
187. See, e.g., EEOC Case No. 6-8-6654, CCH EMP. PRAc. GUIDE 1 6021 (1969).
"--188. Star Box & Printing Co., 69-2 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 5332 (1969) (Bladek,
Arbitrator).
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showed, however, that the materials were split into two thirty-four
pound bundles, which the arbitrator found to make the work "not too
difficult." Moreover, none of grievant's seven similarly-situated female
co-workers complained about the work assignment. "Ability to per-
form a job is a contractual requisite of job right in the application of
seniority rules," is how one arbitrator put it.180 In the dispute at hand,
the company's layoff procedure kept senior women from being laid
off into a general labor pool, an "all-male" classification requiring
heavy work. Instead, they were laid off. Transfer of the women into
the labor pool would, in the company's estimation, "either require the
assignment of women to unsuitable heavy labor or it would require
the company to permit them to pick and choose jobs when reduced
from their home sequence. This is something denied men and would
be discriminatory against men and would violate the contract."'190
Similarly, another arbitrator remarked that the contract did not permit
an individual to bump into a classification "when he is physically fit
to perform only the lighter and less demanding tasks of the occupa-
tion.""' Continuing, he recognized that a company "is not obligated
to 'tailor' the job to the displacing employee."' 92
Another arbitrator, following this same basic approach, added:
"[A] company is not obligated to carve out a new classification for the
layoff occasion or to put an employee in an existing classification and
administer onerous work assignments away from her."' 93  One com-
pany had done just that, by eliminating from the only female's job re-
quirements any duties involving heavy lifting. Contending that this
preferential treatment violated the no-sex bias provision in the con-
tract, her male co-workers filed a grievance which was upheld by an ar-
bitrator. 1 4 He rejected the company's claim that it could divide the
duties among the employees "in any way that efficiently carries out the
work of the [d]epartment;"'' 95 declaring instead that such "is true only
to the extent that there is no unjust discrimination to either sex."' 96 In
189. Weirton Steel Co., 68-2 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 4683, 4685 (1968)
(Kates, Arbitrator).
190. Id. at 4684.
191. Sperry-Rand Corp., 46 Lab. Arb. 961, 964 (1966) (Seitz, Arbitrator).
192. Id.
193. Eastex, Inc., 70-2 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 5109, 5111 (1970) (White,
Arbitrator).
194. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 70-1 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 4124 (1970) (Duff, Ar-
bitrator).
195. Id. at 4126-27.
196. Id. at 4127.
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other words, the company must afford uniform treatment to all em-
ployees within a classification since "both the present Contract and
Federal Statute prohibit any favoritism to either sex."' 97  Accordingly,
he postulated three alternatives for the company to correct the viola-
tion of the contract: (1) assign everybody (including this female) in
this position "to participate in the heavy lifting activities which have
been included in the content of this job for some time"; (2) "create a
new job, classify it and post it for bidding"; or (3) "relieve all Parcel
Post Shippers of heavy lifting and assign such work to other classifi-
cations.'
198
The leading case in this area involved sex-based differentials in
private pension plans, 199 with the court noting that: "[Inn determin-
ing and implementing the terms, conditions or privileges of employ-
ment, any differentiation between employees of different sexes must
rest upon something more than the fact that one employee is a male
and the other is a female. 2 0 0  Thus, the Phillips standard precluding
the application of different employment policies for men and women
clearly is applicable to this area of working conditions.
A. Maternity Leaves of Absence
By virtue of female physiology, the multifaceted question of ac-
cording maternity leaves-as opposed to outright termination of preg-
nant employees-presents issues of sex discrimination applicable to fe-
male employees only.201 Neither Title VII nor any state FEP law ex-
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Rosen v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., CCH EMP. PRAC. GUIDE 8073
(D.N.J. 1970), on remand from 409 F.2d 775 (3d Cir. 1969). See also Bartmess v.
Drewrys U.S.A., Inc., 444 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3219
(No. 71-321, Nov. 9, 1971), which held that differential retirement ages are a "con-
dition of employment" which are illegal under Title VII.
200. Id. at 6213. The court continued: "An employer, to justify discrimina-
tion in this area, must demonstrate to the Court that there is [in fact] a reasonable
basis that the differentiation between male and female in the company pension plan is
based on something more than just sexual differences . . . . Defendant has advanced
no such difference. Why should women be allowed to retire earlier than men-at full
pension? Are these differentiations based on merit? Quality or quantity of service?
Aptitude? Need? These questions remain unanswered." Id.
201. A 1954 compilation of representative clauses from labor contracts con-
cluded that "[a] majority of agreements providing for leave of absence for illness or
other good cause may be presumed to cover maternity. However, in situations where
the allowable period of absence for illness without loss of seniority is of brief duration,
maternity leave is effectively precluded. ...
The period of absence for maternity leave varies considerably. In some agree-
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pressly bans employment discrimination on the basis of an individual
being pregnant.
The EEOC has taken the basic position that pregnant employees
must be offered the alternative of a maternity leave of absence instead
of being automatically terminated. 20 2 Since maternity is a temporary
disability unique to the female sex,2 °0 and more or less to be antici-
pated during the working life of most women employees, the EEOC
feels that pregnant employees cannot ipso facto be terminated "except
[possibly] where the position is one which cannot be left vacant or
filled on a temporary basis during the employee's anticipated ab-
sence."20 4 Noting that termination of pregnant females has an adverse
effect upon the conditions of females' employment, without an equiva-
lent effect upon males, the EEOC has determined that only an em-
ployer's showing of business necessity can justify an employer's re-
fusal to grant maternity leaves of absence.
A federal district court in Schattman v. Texas Employment Com-
mission,20 5 the first judicial pronouncement on the issue of maternity
leaves, recently upheld by implication the EEOC's basic premise that
Title VII precludes termination of employees solely because of their
pregnancy. The precise issue decided was that Title VII is violated
by an employer's maternity leave policy requiring all pregnant em-
ployees to begin their leaves two months before their expected delivery
date.206  In other words, employers cannot satisfy Title VII merely by
the granting of a uniform maternity leave which does not take into ac-
count individual capacities or characteristics, since "the law no longer
permits. . employers. . . to deal with women as a class in relation
to employment to their disadvantage."2  The court thus went further
ments, the amount of permissible leave is indicated; in others, an employee is required
to take a specified period before and after the expected date of delivery, with exten-
sions permitted when necessary." COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE, INC., UNION CON-
TmAcr C AusEs 252-53 (1954).
202. See, e.g., EEOC Decision No. 70-600, CCH EMP. PRAc. GuIDE 11 6122 (1970).
203. EEOC Decision No. 70-360, CCH EMP. PRAc. GumE f 6084, at 4130 (1970).
204. EEOC Decision No. 70-600, CCH EMP. PRAC. GUIDE f 6122, at 4217 (1970).
205. CCH EM'. PRAc. GUIDE 1 8146 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 4, 1971).
206. Id. at 6460.
207. Id., quoting Richards v. Griffith Rubber Mills, 300 F. Supp. 338, 340 (D.
Ore. 1969). The court noted that women were being temporarily terminated "not be-
cause of their unwillingness to continue work, their poor performance, or their need
for personal medical safety, but because of a condition attendant to their sex." Id.
The court continued: 'This is not to say that . . . [an] employer cannot have such
a policy [of requiring pregnant employees to take a maternity leave before delivery]
based on individual medical or job characteristics, but it does mean that broad policies
not so justified are contrary to law." Id.
than the EEOC, which has considered reasonable an employer's man-
datory maternity leave commencing ninety days before the expected de-
livery date. °8
Arbitrators, on the other hand, in sticking to contract interpre-
tation, have been of no assistance to pregnant employees subject to
various discriminations. For example, where a contract permitted an
employer to grant leaves of absence at his discretion, an arbitrator in
1952 interpreted the provision to countenance an employer's refusal
to grant maternity leaves. '  Determining that under the circumstances
pregnancy was "a proper cause for discharge," he noted that the com-
pany insists on "the orderly discharge of duties" along with "as full a
measure of continuity of work as is possible." Moreover, "being a
commercial institution [the company] may go only so far in assisting
individual employees as it cares." 1' Subsequently, Title VII has put a
burden on employers to reasonably accommodate the individual needs
of its employees or potential employees. Even so, arbitrators have
taken the position that maternity leaves are not required if they are not
specifically provided for in a contract.21' Yet, in one case,- - an arbi-
trator did refuse to uphold the discharge of a pregnant employee. The
employee had taken an unauthorized leave when the company denied
her request for a maternity leave, even though her pregnancy was ag-
gravated by arthritis. Since there was no maternity leave provision
in the contract, the company considered her to be a "voluntary quit."
However, the arbitrator, noting her "obvious and known condition,"
determined that the company's policy of granting leaves under such ag-
gravated physical circumstances should have been followed in her case.
This decision, which was rendered just prior to the effective date of
Title VII, certainly was a forerunner of the current philosophy and
stance of the EEOC.
Other arbitration awards have involved company policies requir-
ing maternity leaves to commence at a certain calendar date. Instead
of questioning the nonindividualized treatment, arbitrators have re-
208. EEOC Op. Gen. Counsel, CCH EMP. PRAC. GUIDE 1219.17 (1966).
209. Texas Co., 19 Lab. Arb. 709 (1952) (McGraw, Arbitrator).
210. Id. at 710.
211. Chattanooga Box & Lumber Co., 65-1 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 3682, 3684-
85 (1965) (Tatum, Arbitrator). See also Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 45 Lab. Arb. 621
(1965) (Herbert, Arbitrator). Here, the arbitrator-in upholding the termination of a
pregnant employee as a "voluntary quit'-pointed out that the employer had demon-
strated an established practice, known to the union, of terminating pregnant em-
ployees.
212. Western Battery & Supply Co., 65-2 CCi Lab. Arb. Awards 4832 (1965)
(Linn, Arbitrator).
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stricted themselves to contract interpretation. In one case,21 3 an arbi-
trator held that there was "just cause" for discharge of an employee who
failed to timely report her pregnancy to her superior as required in the
contract. Another arbitrator 14 determined that employees on a man-
datory six-month maternity leave are not entitled to full paid vacations
since the contract exempted from vacation benefits those employees on
layoff or illness in excess of sixty days during the calendar year. Opin-
ing that maternity leave is a layoff, he further observed that giving fe-
males on six month maternity leave the same vacation benefits as those
on the job during the full year would be giving them something for
nothing.
215
Faced with a contract provision for automatic termination of air-
line stewardesses upon their becoming pregnant, a board of arbitra-
tion determined that it lacked the authority to refuse enforcement of that
particular provision, even though the EEOC had determined that the
provision was illegal under Title V.11' 6 The EEOC's position was that
the company should grant maternity leaves in addition to the leaves of
absence for sickness or injury authorized under the collective bargain-
ing agreement. No further action was taken in that case after the
EEOC failed to conciliate the matter. The grievants requested the
board of arbitration to determine that pregnancy is a sickness or injury
subject to sick leave tenure; but the board refused, stating instead:
"Pregnancy is a normal, healthy condition resulting in temporary dis-
ability but is not health, injury, sickness or special assignment within
the meaning of [the sick leave provision]."21  One of the arbitrators
agreed that the employer had properly denied full vacation credit to
an employee on a mandatory maternity leave under a contract authoriz-
ing a maximum of six month's maternity leave.218  Taking notice of
two unsuccessful attempts to amend the contract to grant full vaca-
tion benefits to employees on maternity leave, he agreed that the com-
213. R & G Sloane Mfg., 68-1 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 3594, 3596 (1968)
(Roberts, Arbitrator).
214. Clean Coverall Supply Co., 66-2 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 5507 (1966)
(Whitney, Arbitrator).
215. Id. at 5513. Neither Schattman v. Texas Employment Comm'n, CCH EMP.
PRAc. GUIDE 8146 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 4, 1971), nor the EEOC has taken the position
that vacation benefits must be continued during maternity leaves. However, the EEOC
has held that seniority accrues during a reasonable maternity leave.
216. Western Airlines, Inc., 70-1 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 4211, 4213 (1970)
(Wyckoff, Referee).
217. Id. at 4211.
218. Hospital Serv. Plan, 66-3 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 6820 (1966) (Scheiber,
Arbitrator).
pany's prorated vacation benefits policy was equitable.
Future arbitration will have to take into account not only the re-
cent district court decision in Schattman. v. Texas Employment Com-
mission,2 19 but also some unusual twists arising from male reaction to
the women's liberation movement. For example, the novel issue of
granting maternity leaves of absence to male employees has arisen in
contract negotiations at nine pulp and paper mills in British Columbia.
Four months of maternity leave is being asked apparently to equate the
male employees' fringe benefits with those of female employees. More-
over, the union also contends that a male employee is entitled to have
time off to mind the children while his wife is in the hospital having a
baby.220 In two recent cases, one United States district court up-
held,22' while another invalidated,222 mandatory leave provisions of
state law under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than under Title
VII. Even more recently, another district court held that it was a vio-
lation of equal protection to accord maternity leave only to tenured
teachers, saying that untenured teachers should also receive leave when
requested.223
B. Leaves of Absence for Jury Duty
Sex discrimination has also arisen in employer policies regarding
paid leaves of absence for jury duty. A New York Supreme Court,
for example, has held that a company is not guilty of sex discrimina-
tion under the New York FEP Act when it does not pay the regular
salary to absent women employees serving as jurors even though it
pays the salary of men serving as jurors.224 The contract in question
stated that teachers serving as jurors, who are required to do so, shall
receive their full regular salary provided that they remit their juror pay
to the school; whereas teachers serving as jurors, although not required
by law to do so, shall receive no pay other than their juror pay. The
court's rationale was that since state law made jury duty mandatory
for males while exempting women from mandatory jury duty, then a
female juror was a volunteer who could not insist upon being paid her
219. CCH EMP. PRAC. GUIDE 8146 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 4, 1971).
220. Des Moines Tribune, July 31, 1970, at 1, col. 3.
221. Jinks v. Mays, - F. Supp. - (N.D. Ga. Sept. 28, 1971), summarized in
40 U.S.L.W. 2193 (1971).
222. LaFleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 326 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
223. Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd., 326 F. Supp. 1159 (E.D. Vir.
1971).
224. Goldblatt v. Board of Educ., 57 Misc. 2d 1089, 294 N.Y.S.2d 272 (Sup.
Ct. 1968).
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salary from the employer. This approach no longer seems viable in
light of the subsequent head-on attacks on sex-based state legislation.
Such a juror exemption law as New York's seems susceptible to an
equal protection attack similar to that made in Mengelkoch v. Indus-
trial Welfare Comm'n. 25
An arbitrator took the same basic position a year earlier in a case
involving the same school district but a different contract. 22 6 That
contract provided for full regular pay, less juror pay, for (male) teach-
ers serving as jurors because they were "required" to do so, but pro-
vided for no salary for (female) teachers serving as jurors although
not "required" to do so. However, females were given a leave of ab-
sence for jury duty and they could keep their juror pay. The arbi-
trator declared: "I find nothing discriminatory in a contract clause
which grants a benefit only to employees who are required to serve on
a jury, and, in effect, imposes a different obligation on employees who
are not required to serve but do so anyway. 
'227
The arbitrator, however, unlike the court, also perceptively con-
tinued: "If there is any discrimination involved here, it lies in the law
exempting certain people from jury duty, not in the contract. ' 228  The
arbitrator could do no more, since his function was limited to inter-
pretation of the contract; he obviously lacked any authority to declare
illegal or unconstitutional the state law (exempting women but not
men from mandatory jury duty). He then was called upon solely to
interpret the word "required." -The school contended that those "re-
quired" to serve meant only male teachers since they (unlike females
generally as a class) did not enjoy blanket statutory exemption from
mandatory jury duty. On the other hand, the teachers' union con-
tended that "required" encompassed female teachers who, while they
were exempted from mandatory jury duty ipso facto being women,
nevertheless felt compelled ("required") to serve as jurors as part of
their civic duties in being examples for their students. The arbitrator
adopted the school's interpretation. 29
225. 3 FAIR Ezp. PRAc. CAs. 471 (9th Cir., May 3, 1971). The Ninth Circuit
held that a three-judge district court erred in treating an equal protection clause at-
tack on California's maximum hours legislation as constitutionally insubstantial.
226. Board of Educ., 45 Lab. Arb. 265, 65-2 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 5361
(1965) (Stutz, Arbitrator).
227. Id. at 266, 65-2 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards at 5362.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 265-66, 65-2 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards at 5361-62.
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C. Personal Appearance
Another developing problem area involves the question of whether
there may be a legitimate bfoq in employee appearance. Recent style
"revolutions" have prompted hasty action by many employers in pro-
mulgating personal appearance codes geared primarily to the two
much discussed issues of female employees wearing pant suits and male
employees sporting long hair, moustaches, or beards. The validity of
these rules, since they infringe upon individual rights, depends mainly
upon whether they serve a valid and reasonable business need. 30
1. Long Hair
The question of whether an employer's ban on long hair for male
employees can constitute sex discrimination is presently being tested
in several fora. The EEOC has ruled that Title VII is violated when,
absent a showing of business necessity, an employer refuses to hire a
long-haired male and applies no similar restriction to females. 231  The
first court of record that has, to date, decided the issue held that Title
VII was not violated by an employer's hair-length regulations if they
applied to males and females alike.23 2  Characterizing the regulations
as being "not unreasonable," the federal district court determined that
their purpose was "to insure a neat and attractive, well groomed male
230. See generally Current Comment, Personal Choice Must Be Based on Busi-
ness Needs, CCH EMP. PRAC. GUIDE 5158 (1971).
231. EEOC Decision No. 71-1529, CCH EMiP. PiRc. GUIDE 6231 (Apr. 2,
1971). Finding that long hair would not have been a factor in the hiring process if
the charging party were a female, the EEOC noted that the employer admitted em-
ploying both long- and short-haired females. Regarding the lack of a showing of
business necessity (that male employees have short hair), the EEOC stated: "There
is no claim or evidence that long hair would present safety or efficiency problems in
the production areas; or that, assuming such problems, that a hairnet or other device
would not solve the problem .... ." Id. at 4410.
232. Dodge v. Grant Food, Inc., 3 FAIR EMP. PRAc. CAs. 374 (D.D.C. 1971).
The employer operated self-service supermarkets selling foodstuffs. The court also
noted that the regulations were the product of arbitration between the company and
the union, "and were accepted by the Union as reasonable and acceptable."
Another federal district court is also considering the issue. Johnson v. Baptist
Memorial Hosp., No. C-70-416 (W.D. Tenn. 1971), noted in CCH EMP. PR.c. GUIDE,
Rep. No. 62 at 3 (Mar. 4, 1971). The EEOC filed an amicus curiae brief in that
case, arguing that the exclusive application of a restriction upon hair length to males
constitutes a disparate term or condition of employment based upon sex in contraven-
tion of Title VII. Applying the Weeks approach, the EEOC asserted that the defend-
ant company must show a business need for a rule that male employees cannot have
long hair. In other words, the employer must show that all males with long hair
cannot safely and efficiently perform particular jobs while females with the same
length of hair could perform the same jobs safely and efficiently.
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or female clerk." However, another United States district court held
that males with long hair must be permitted to wear the same hair re-
straints (hair nets) as women, instead of cutting their hair when it
became too long to be covered by their working hats.238
The long hair issue has also been posed in terms of the constitu-
tional right of expression, with a federal court of appeals stating defi-
nitively: "The right to wear one's hair at any length or in any desired
manner is an ingredient of personal freedom protected by the United
States Constitution."23  In another school dress code case, this same
court observed: "Since fundamental rights are involved, we believe
that [school officials] are required to employ narrow rules . . . and
to avoid infringement of plaintiff's rights to an extent greater than is
required by health and safety objectives. '2
35
By analogy, an employer cannot arbitrarily refuse to hire a long-
haired male merely because of the employer's distaste for persons who
do not conform to society's norms as perceived by the employer. How-
ever, this is not to say that an otherwise qualified male with any length
of hair must be considered for every type of job. Health and safety
objectives relating to that job must be taken into consideration, pro-
vided that they are legitimate and are not used as a smokescreen.
Thus, an employer can require a long-haired employee to wear some
type of headgear as a health and safety measure, provided that the
same regulation is applicable to female employees doing substantially
the same type of work in that plant.
So far, the issue of hair length regulations has been posed in only
one arbitral hearing. An arbitrator ruled that because of business nec-
essity a company's rule banning long hair on male employees was rea-
sonably related to the successful operation of the company's business,
especially since the grievant frequently came into public contact with
the customers.230 The decision was pegged upon customer preference
(a concept rejected by a federal court of appeals in Diaz v. Pan Ameri-
can World Airways, Inc.23 ), with the arbitrator noting that "there is a
real danger that a considerable number of the Company's customers
233. Roberts v. General Mills, Inc., - F. Supp. - (N.D. Ohio Sept. 21, 1971)
summarized in 40 U.S.L.W. 2188 (1971).
234. Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034, 1036 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 937 (1970). See also Bishop v. Colaw, - F.2d -, 40 U.S.LW. 2296 (No.
20,588, Oct 27, 1971) (slip op. at 11-15).
235. Crews v. Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259, 1266 (7th Cir. 1970).
236. Allied Employers, Inc., 71-1 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 3276 (1970) (Klein-
sorge, Arbitrator).
237. 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3212 (1971).
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would have an unfavorable reaction to males with long hair working
in the store," 38 even though they maintained an otherwise neat ap-
pearance. Nevertheless, the arbitrator did not believe it necessary that
any complaints be lodged against the grievant or that certain customers
be lost. "If the danger is there, and if application of the rule will re-
move the danger, the Company is acting reasonably in attempting to
protect itself."23 9  Conceding that female employees with the same
length of hair were not discharged, he observed that "long hair on a
man might be very conspicuous, while the same length hair on a woman
would not be."'2 40  Thus, in his opinion, the no-sex bias protections in
Title VII and the collective bargaining agreement were not violated.
Another arbitrator, while deciding a case on the basis of an em-
ployer's no-beards rule and its lack of "a reasonable relationship to the
employer's business operations," touched upon hair rules involving sex
discrimination.241 He noted: "Few employers would dare to regulate
the hair styles of their female employees so long as the hair styles did
not present safety or sanitary problems and were not outlandish or bi-
zarre." '242 Likewise, he felt that a beardless male face should not be
a condition of continued employment.
Other arbitration cases, none of which even mentioned the sex dis-
crimination issue, demonstrate the breadth of considerations that could
guide arbitrators (and courts) in any future sex bias cases involving
long hair.2 43  The prevailing theory in arbitration is that "the [clom-
pany has the right to require its employees to cut their hair and shave
when long hair and beards can reasonably threaten the [c]ompany's
relations with its customers or other employees, or a real question of
safety is involved . ".. ., Otherwise, a male employee has "the
right to maintain whatever fashion of hair he desire[s] so long as it
[does] not affect his work, the [c]ompany's relations with other cus-
tomers, or the work routine of the other employees. 245
Arbitrators upholding long hair bans have stressed that an indi-
238. 71-1 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards at 3280.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 3281.
241. Roger Wilco Stores, 70-2 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 5088, 5093 (1970) (Bums,
Arbitrator).
242. Id. at 5093.
243. See generally Current Comment, Hair Styles: Management's Right to Regu-
late, CCH LAB. LAW REP., UNION CoNT. AB. 58,601 (1970).
244. Dravo Corp., 70-2 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 4507, 4509 (1970) (Krimsly,
Arbitrator).
245. Id. at 4510.
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vidual's constitutional right to wear his hair at any length must be bal-
anced against the employer's right to protect his business. "[Ain in-
dividual, by voluntarily entering into an employment relationship, must,
as a condition of his employment, accept certain restrictions upon his
actions," is how one arbitrator put it.246  A company with a proven
business need to project a certain image to the public can place rea-
sonable restrictions upon the length of male employee's hair.2 47  Rec-
ognizing that businesses have an extensive need to rely on public trust
and confidence, one arbitrator has observed: "Whether right or wrong,
the vast majority of the public has come to associate long hair and
beards with irresponsibility. '248  Even where long hair bans have been
ruled unreasonable, the arbitrator has nevertheless followed the ap-
proach that an employer can enforce reasonable rules regarding the
personal appearance of those employees who come into contact with
the public.
249
Long hair bans have also been upheld for sanitation reasons, with
one arbitrator quipping: "Although hair styles have changed, sanita-
tion needs have not."2 50  Yet rules promulgated on safety and sani-
tary grounds have been closely scrutinized. Medical evidence has
been required to substantiate the necessity of a hair rule based on sani-
tation, while valid safety rules for a plant's production area have
been held inapplicable to an employee working in a nondanger area. 2r 1
One arbitrator pointed out that if the particular work in question in-
volved hazardous work then requiring the wearing of a hard hat would
provide for better protection than would a short haircut. 52 In other
words, the propriety of hair rules should be measured by the extent of
their effect on the employee's private life, thus requiring the option of
246. Dravo Corp., 67-1 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards, 4027, 4029 (1967) (Wood, Arbi-
trator); accord, Stop & Shop, Inc., 68-1 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 3133 (1967) (Johnson,
Arbitrator).
247. See Paul Masson, Inc., 70-2 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 5440 (1970) (Kenaston,
Arbitrator).
248. Western Air Lines, Inc., 69-2 CCII Lab. Arb. Awards 5566, 5568 (1969)
(Steese, Arbitrator).
249. See, e.g., United Parcel Service, Inc., 69-1 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 3185
(1968) (Turkus, Arbitrator). The arbitrator, while ruling that a policy against
beards was unreasonable, concluded that employees serving the public can be required
to be clean-shaven.
250. Kellogg Co., 70-2 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 5476, 5480 (1970) (Shearer,
Arbitrator).
251. See Badger Concrete Co., 68-2 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 4748 (1968)
(Krinsky, Arbitrator).
252. Giles & Ransome Corp., 70-1 CCII Lab. Arb. Awards 4063, 4065 (1969)
(Loucks, Arbitrator).
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alternative means of upholding safety (e.g., protective headgear).2 51
The broad view is that hair rules must bear "a reasonable rela-
tionship to the employer's business and to the work of the [individual]
employee involved", as well as to the standards of the community
within which the company operates.254 Thus, some arbitrators, apply-
ing Weeks and Bowe, have insisted that hair rules be applied on an in-
dividualized basis.255  Moreover, arbitrators have recognized that
grooming rules "should reflect contemporary changes in style. 256
2. Dress Regulations
The issue of dress regulations is also being tested in the courts.
One novel suit cuts to the heart of conventional ideas about dress and
morality. A women fired by an Arkansas textile mill for reporting
to work without wearing a brassiere has filed suit in federal district
court, after the EEOC failed to conciliate her complaint.2 51 She as-
serts that Title VII is violated when a company places restrictions on
women's dress while not requiring that males "be attired in any special
garb." She notes, for example, that male employees work without un-
dershirts. The company claims that the bra-less employee "caused a
disruptive effect among employees and plant efficiency," and that some
female employees objected to her braless appearance. She is seeking
reinstatement and back pay.
Women's wearing of slacks has been another problem in the area
of employees' attire. For example, the EEOC has determined that
Title VII is violated by a company policy which forbids female em-
ployees from wearing slacks but which places no restrictions upon male
attire (thus allowing male employees to wear casuals or sportswear).2"8
Similarly, an arbitrator found that a company did not show good cause
for banning female employees from wearing "street" slacks underneath
their sanitary smocks in a bakery.259 The company had agreed to pro-
253. See Roger Wilco Stores, 70-2 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 5088 (1970) (Bums,
Arbitrator).
254. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 70-2 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 5703, 5706 (1970)
(Eaton, Arbitrator).
255. See, e.g., City of Waterbury, 70-1 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 4305 (1970)
(Stutz, Arbitrator).
256. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 70-2 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 5703, 5706 (1970)
(Eaton, Arbitrator).
257. BNA, LAB. REL. REP., FAIR PRAC., SuMM. No. 148 (Oct. 22, 1970).
258. EEOC Decision No. 70-920, CCH EMP. PRAC. GUIDE V 6156 (1970).
259. Drake Batteries, 71-1 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 3561 (Feb. 12, 1971) (KerN-
son, Arbitrator).
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vide slacks as part of the standard uniform, and the employees were
merely wearing their own while awaiting the arrival of these slacks.
The company sought to justify its ban on "street" slacks on the basis
of hygienic practice, but the arbitrator found more persuasive the un-
ion's argument that no applicable sanitary code was violated. More-
over, the union successfully argued that wearing the street slacks was
reasonable in light of the facts that the employees were working in a
drafty area and that their smocks extended beyond the work bench
where the food was handled.
C. Separate Seniority Lists
One of the most pervasive problems in employment sex discrimi-
nation is the maintenance of separate sex-based seniority lists with ac-
companying sex-based separate lines of progression to various jobs.
Jobs traditionally have been labeled either "men's" jobs or "women's"
jobs, with separate seniority lists kept for those employees in each
of the jobs. Accordingly, before 1965, arbitrators steadfastly ruled
that any attempt to integrate the separate seniority lists dictated by a
labor contract was invalid.20 °
Title VII, however, changes the public policy concerning seniority
systems.20 1 The EEOC guidelines on sex discrimination state: "It is
an unlawful employment practice to classify a job as 'male' or 'female'
or to maintain separate . . . seniority lists based on sex where this
would adversely affect any employee unless sex is a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification for that job." ' The EEOC subsequently held
that perpetuation of original sex-segregated classification systems for
seniority lists violates Title VII. Thus, plantwide seniority has been
260. For example, one arbitrator held that an employer violated a contract's
provision for separate seniority lists by transferring female employees to male jobs and
vice versa. L.D. Schreiber Cheese Co., 44 Lab. Arb. 873 (1965) (Anderson, Arbi-
trator). Another arbitrator, upholding an employer's right to select male inspectors
for retention during layoff without regard to seniority of female inspectors, held that
the separate sex-based seniority lists were consistent with past practices. Owens-
Illinois Glass Co., 43 Lab. Arb. 715 (1964) (Dworkin, Arbitrator). Moreover, he
noted that the union had failed to negotiate contract language that would reverse this
situation. Likewise, another arbitrator held that a company's dual seniority system was
existing at the time that the present contract was negotiated and the union did not
question the practice. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 8 Lab. Arb. 572 (1947) (Horvitz,
Arbitrator). So, an arbitrator, in interpreting the contract, could not change the prac-
tice himself.
261. Title VII § 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1964).
262. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 (1970). See also 41 C.F.R. § 60-20.4 (1970) (seniority
guidelines of the Office of Federal Contract Compliance).
(Altrock, Arbitrator).
determined necessary to overcome past discriminatory effects whereby
females were segregated both by department and job classification.263
This approach by the EEOC is in line with that taken by a federal
district court in Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc. 264 (a race discrimination
case).
At least one arbitrator subsequently took the strong position of or-
dering a company and union to negotiate an integration of job de-
scriptions and lines of progression to eliminate the effects of sex-dis-
crimination. 5  Such severe orders will be necessary in the future if
companies are truly to eliminate sex discrimination in the industrial
arena.
IV. Conclusion
The purpose of this article was to analyze the Title VII bfoq ex-
emption as applied in the arbitral forum and to compare it to the treat-
ment the bfoq exemption has received in judicial decisions and adminis-
trative guidelines. While a conflict still exists over the proper scope of
arbitral hearings, the view that contract interpretations should properly
consider the federal and state laws applicable to the circumstances
seems to have prevailed. Thus, Title VII and the bfoq have frequently
been applied in arbitral decisions and have had a significant impact.
Prior to the passage of Title VII, most arbitrators adopted a stereo-
typed conception of women and allowed protective laws to control.
But, on occasion, arbitral independence from the constrictions of ju-
dicial precedent resulted in decisions directing a more individualized
treatment of women and men. On those few occasions, arbitration
was a forerunner of recent legislation and its judicial interpretations.
After the passage of Title VII, arbitrators seem to have followed the
lead of courts in rejecting various employment practices, but the deci-
sions are not uniform, particularly when heavy lifting has been involved.
Certainly, arbitration has not distinguished itself as more effective than
the courts at preventing sex discrimination, and, in some cases, has been
much slower to recognize evolving standards. In both areas, a serious
problem also exists due to conflicting decisions from courts of equal
status in adjacent or overlapping geographic jurisdictions.
266
In general, the arbitral process and the judicial process have
263. See, e.g., EEOC Decision No. 71-362, CCH EMP. PaAc. GUEDE 6169 (1970).
264. 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
265. South Pittsburgh Water Co., 71-1 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 4516 (1971)
(Altrock, Arbitrator).
266. See, for example, text accompanying notes 97-100 supra.
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reached quite similar results in their interpretation of Title VII pro-
scriptions, largely due to arbitrators following court precedents. But
this will have to change in the near future. As court congestion in-
creasingly forces grievants to resort to arbitration as a means of dispute
settlement, arbitrators will have to abandon their reliance on court de-
terminations and their reluctance to formulate new standards on their
own. Industrial jurisprudence will have to give up any pretense of
limiting the scope of its deliberations or abdicate its increasing judicial
responsibility. This may be a period of transition for the arbitral proc-
ess just as it is a period of transition for women's rights. The end re-
sult for each will, in large part, depend upon how successfully the two
become intertwined and whether they complement each other's growth
or come into conflict in this vital area of national policy.

